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The first two roles of the U.S. Attorney General from its
inception were to represent the interests of the United States before
the U.S. Supreme Court and to advise the President on matters of the
law. Despite the Attorney General delegating both roles, the former
to the Solicitor General and the latter to the Office of Legal Counsel
(OLC), the Attorney General and the Department of Justice are by
statute and tradition looked upon to be the protectors of the rule of
law within the Executive Branch. It is to the Attorney General, and
by delegation to the OLC, to say to the strong seas of presidential
power, this far and no farther will you come and here your proud
waves must stop! The role of the OLC to provide dispositive opinions
on the meaning of the law and to protect the rule of law requires that
the OLC provide a specific type of advice that separates it from other
types of legal advice from other quarters within the Executive
Branch. After September 11th, the Bush Administration’s OLC
abandoned the Neutral Expositor of the best view of the law model
and advanced a Private Lawyer model to advising the President.
This article reviews the literature on the proper role of the OLC
within the Executive Branch and places the torture memos within a
broader context of the OLC’s failure to maintain its proper role of a
quasi-judicial advisor on the meaning of law.

I. INTRODUCTION
Under the Constitution, the President is required to faithfully
execute the law, is authorized to seek advice from his department
heads when making policy, and is the Commander-in-Chief of the
Army and Navy.1 After the events of September 11, 2001, President
Bush sought the advice of the Department of Justice Office of Legal
* Arthur H. Garrison is an Assistant Professor of Criminal Justice at
Kutztown University in Kutztown, PA. Dr. Garrison received a B.S. from
Kutztown University, a M.S. from West Chester University, and a Doctor of Law
and Policy from Northeastern University. Dr. Garrison is author of SUPREME
COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A
HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011).
1

See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1; and U.S.
CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1.
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Counsel (OLC) for a binding legal opinion2 on presidential authority
to respond to the attacks of al Qaeda and its supporters.3 It has been
eleven years since the OLC issued a set of opinions that authorized
the President to order enhanced interrogation techniques of captured
enemy combatants as a result of the military actions in Afghanistan
and later in Iraq. On August 1, 2002, the OLC issued two opinions
regarding the President’s power to designate captured individuals as
enemy combatants and how they could be interrogated for
information helpful in the war on terror.
The first memo,
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales Counsel to the President Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 23402340A [hereinafter August 2002 Memo],4 asserted that a set of
proposed interrogation techniques were not a violation of federal law
prohibiting torture5 and international law.6 The second memo,
Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of Central
Intelligence Agency Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative, August
1, 2002 [hereinafter CIA Interrogation Memo],7 asserted that a list of
ten specific techniques8 used on specific captured terrorists did not
2

See Arthur H. Garrison, The Opinions by the Attorney General and The
Office of Legal Counsel: The How and Why They are Significant, 76 ALB. L. REV.
(forthcoming 2013) (discussing the historical development of the quasi-judicial
authority of the Attorney General and later the OLC to issue binding opinions on
the meaning of the law within the Executive Branch).
3
Arthur H. Garrison, The Office of Legal Counsel “Torture Memos”: A
Content Analysis of What the OLC Got Right and What They Got Wrong, 49 CRIM.
L. BULL. (forthcoming 2013).
4
Memorandum for Alberto R. Gonzales, Counsel to the President. Re:
Standards of Conduct for Interrogation under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340-2340A
[hereinafter August 2002 Memo].
5
18 U.S.C. § 2340 (2006).
6
United Nations Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment, Dec. 10, 1984, S. TREATY DOC. NO. 100-20,
1465 U.N.T.S. 85 [hereinafter CAT].
7
Memorandum for John Rizzo Acting General Counsel of the Central
Intelligence Agency, Re: Interrogation of al Qaeda Operative (Aug. 1, 2002)
[hereinafter CIA Interrogation Memo].
8
The memo concluded that the following ten techniques did not violate 18
U.S.C. § 2340A:
(1) attention grasp, (2) walling, (3) facial hold, (4) facial slap
(insult slap), (5) cramped confinement, (6) wall standing, (7)
stress positions, (8) sleep deprivation, (9) insects placed in a
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violate federal and international law. Together, the opinions asserted
that (1) the interrogation techniques proposed by the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the military did not violate federal or
international law (2), even if the techniques did, neither federal or
international law placed limits on the power of the President as
Commander-in-Chief to act in the war on terror (3), and thus the
application of Section 2340 (domestic law prohibiting torture by
officials of the U.S. government) to the interrogation of detainees
would be an unconstitutional violation under the separation of
powers doctrine.9 A third memo issued on March 14, 2003,
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel to the
Department of Defense Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful
Combatants Held Outside the United States [hereinafter Military
Interrogation Memo],10 asserted that enemy combatants held outside
United States’ territory did not enjoy protection from federal law
prohibiting torture.
Much has been written on the OLC’s memos.
The
scholarship on the memos have focused on the legal assertions made
by the OLC11 as well as focused on why the August 2002, the CIA
confinement box, and (10) the waterboard . . . [All of which
would] be used in some sort of escalating fashion, culminating
with the waterboard, though not necessarily ending with this
technique.
CIA Interrogation Memo, supra note 7, at 2.
9
See Garrison, supra note 3; Arthur H. Garrison, The Bush Administration
and the Torture Memos: A Content Analysis of the Response of the Academic Legal
Community, 11 (1) CARDOZO PUB. L. POL’Y & ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2012).
10
Memorandum for William J. Haynes II, General Counsel to the
Department of Defense Re: Military Interrogation of Alien Unlawful Combatants
Held Outside the United States (Mar. 14, 2003) (on file with OLC) [hereinafter
Military Interrogation Memo].
11
See generally Arthur H. Garrison, Hamdi, Padilla and Rasul: The War
on Terrorism on the Judicial Front, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 99 (2003); Arthur
Garrison, The Bush Administration and the War on Terrorism on the Judicial Front
II: The Courts Strike Back, 27 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 473 (2004); George C. Harris,
The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The Professional Responsibilities of
Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. L. & POL’Y 409
(2005); Jeremy Waldron, Torture and Positive Law: Jurisprudence for the White
House, 105 COLUM. L. REV. 1681 (2005); Kathleen Clark, Ethical Issues Raised by
the OLC Torture Memorandum, 1 J. NAT’L SEC. & POL’Y 455 (2005); David J.
Gottlieb, How We Came to Torture, 14 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 449 (2005); Jordan
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Interrogation, and Military Interrogation memos did not survive
public scrutiny,12 as well as, the OLC’s subsequent withdrawal13 of
all its 9/11 opinions.14 However, there has been less research focused
on the proper role of the OLC when it provides legal advice to the
President and how its advice differs from legal advice from other

J. Paust, Executive Plans and Authorizations to Violate International Law
Concerning Treatment and Interrogation of Detainees, 43 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L
L. 811 (2005); Johannes van Aggelen, A Response to John C. Yoo, The Status of
Soldiers and Terrorists Under The Geneva Conventions, 4 CHINESE J. INT’L L. 167
(2005); Louis-Philippe F. Rouilard, Misinterpreting the Prohibition of Torture
Under International Law: The Office of Legal Counsel Memorandum, 21 AM. U.
INT’L L. REV. 9 (2005); Arthur H. Garrison, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, Military
Commissions, and Acts of Congress: A Summary, 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 339
(2006); JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS (2006); Arthur Garrison, The Judiciary
in Times of National Security Crisis and Terrorism: Ubi Inter Arma Enim Silent
Leges, Quis Custodiet Ipso Custodies? 30 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 165 (2006);
Cornella Pillard, Unitariness and Myopia: The Executive Branch, Legal Process,
and Torture, 81 IND. L.J. 1297 (2006); Dawn Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the
Laws: Internal Legal Constraints of Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559
(2007); JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT INSIDE
THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION (2007); Dawn Johnsen, All the President’s Lawyers:
How to Avoid Another “Torture Opinion” Debacle, AM. CONST. SOC’Y FOR L. &
POL’Y (2007); Arthur Garrison, Hamiltonian and Madisonian Democracy, the Rule
of Law and Why the Courts Have a Role in the War on Terror, 8 J. INST. JUST. &
INT’L STUDIES 120 (2008); DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING
THE UNTHINKABLE (2009); Joseph Lavitt, The Crime of Conviction of John Choon
Yoo: The Actual Criminality in the OLC During the Bush Administration, 62 ME.
L. REV. 155 (2010); Michael P. Scharf, The Torture Lawyers, 20 DUKE J. COMP. &
INT’L L. 389 (2010); Janet Cooper Alexander, John Yoo’s War Powers: The Law
Review and the World, 100 CALIF. L. REV. 331 (2012).
12
See Memorandum for James B. Comey, Deputy Attorney General Re:
Legal Standards Applicable under 18 U.S.C. §§ 2340–2340A (Dec. 30, 2004) (on
file with OLC) [hereinafter December 2004 Memo]; Garrison, supra note 3;
Garrison, supra note 9.
13
See December 2004 Memo, supra note 12.
14
See David J. Barron, Memorandum for the Attorney General Re:
Withdrawal of Office of Legal Counsel CIA Interrogation Opinions (Apr. 15, 2009)
(on file with OLC) [hereinafter April 2009 Memo]; Memo for the Files: Re: Status
of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of
September 11, 2001 (Jan. 15, 2009) [hereinafter January 2009 Memo]. The
January 2009 Memo together with the April 2009 Memo withdrew all of the
controversial OLC post-9/11 opinions during the first two years of the Bush
Administration. See Garrison, supra note 3 (discussing the December 2004 Memo,
January 2009 Memo, and April 2009 Memo).
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Executive Branch attorneys.15 This article focuses on that question.
Specifically, this article reviews the literature on executive legal
opinion writing and asserts that during the first two years after the
events of 9/11, the OLC under President Bush confused its role as a
neutral expositor of the law with the role of legal policymaking. Part
II of this article reviews the literature on the role of attorneys within
the Executive Branch and the differences within those roles in

15

For example, see Professor Gibson who observed that:

Until recently, there was very little written about OLC whether
popular press or scholarly work. Indeed, until the George W.
Bush administration, with few exceptions, the scholars who
researched OLC were OLC alums themselves . . . . Despite all of
the attention by former OLC attorneys and the popular media,
and the obvious attention to political scientists to the executive
branch, laws, public policy and the like, there is very little about
the Office of Legal Counsel written by political scientists.
Tobias T. Gibson, Office of Legal Counsel: Inner Workings and Impact, 18 LAW &
COURTS 7, 7 (2008).
Research on the OLC is almost nonexistent in comparison to the research
on the Department of Justice in general or specifically on the Attorney General.
See infra note 35. Even the well cited Luther A. Huston only allocates one
paragraph to the history and purpose of Office of Legal Counsel almost as an after
thought. LUTHER A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1967). See also
Frank M. Wozencraft, OLC: The Unfamiliar Acronym, 57 A.B.A. J. 33 (1971). See
generally Symposium, Government Lawyering, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
(1998) (a symposium of articles on the roles and duties of government lawyers). A
search in the ProQuest Dissertation and Theses database reveals that there are only
four graduate/doctoral level works that provide specific detailed review of the
history, purpose, or operation of the OLC. See Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of
Law and What the Law Rules: The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on
the Commander-in-Chief Power and the Department of Justice Office of Legal
Counsel Torture and Commander-in-Chief Opinions During the First Two Years of
the Bush Administration after September 11 (2011) (unpublished doctoral thesis)
(on file at Northeastern University); William O’Donnal Sass, A Rhetorical History
of the Office of Legal Counsel (2010) (unpublished thesis, University of Nevada,
Las Vegas) (on file with University of Nevada, Las Vegas); Tobias Tandy Gibson,
The Office of Legal Counsel and the Presidency: The Legal Strategy of Executive
Orders (2006) (unpublished Ph.D thesis, Washington University in St. Louis) (on
file at Washington University in St. Louis); James Michael Strine, The Office of
Legal Counsel: Legal Professionals in a Political System (1992) (unpublished
dissertation) (on file at Johns Hopkins University).
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determining the meaning of law and policy making. Part II also
reviews opinions and articles on the role of the OLC, in comparison
to other Executive Branch attorneys, by past Attorneys General and
Assistant Attorneys General who served as heads of the OLC. Part
III places the proper role of the OLC in context with the
administrative and political dynamics of the Executive Branch and
the differing types of legal analysis that is required by the President
to assist him in fulfilling his responsibility to faithfully execute the
law. Part III also provides a review of the administrative and
political isolation by the Bush Administration of the State
Department, Civilian Military Legal Advisors, and the Judge
Advocates Generals’ (JAGs) legal opinions on the applicability of the
Geneva Convention to the issue of interrogation and the rejection of
the OLC opinions. Specific attention is given to the legal opinions
issued by the JAGs, as well as, the civilian military community to
review the significance of OLC opinions upon executive branch
policymaking. Part IV concludes with a critique of the OLC within
the context of its proper role in inter-executive branch legal policy
and decision-making, and provides an explanation of the torture
memos as the result of the failure of the Bush Administration’s OLC
to maintain its institutional role as protector of the rule of law and the
neutral expositor of what the law requires within the Executive Brach
and the significance of that failure.16
II. THE OLC AND THE MODELS OF ADVISING THE PRESIDENT
On November 15, 1992, Attorney General William Barr, who
served as Attorney General (1991–1993), Deputy Attorney General
(1990–1991) and as Assistant Attorney General of the OLC (1989–
1990) under the first Bush Administration, provided remarks at the
Cardozo School of Law symposium on the role of the Attorney
General, and his remarks were published in a symposium journal
special issue.17 Under Article II, Section 3 of the Constitution, the
President is authorized to ensure that the laws are faithfully
executed.18 Under the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Attorney General is
16

See Garrison, supra notes 3 and 9.
William Barr, Attorney General’s Remarks, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, November 15, 1992, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 31 (1993).
18
U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3.
17
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authorized to provide legal advice to the President when requested.
And under Presidential Executive Orders, the OLC has the
responsibility to provide binding opinions on all branches of the
Executive Branch,19 except the Office of the Solicitor General.20
19

Garrison, supra note 2; Tobias T. Gibson, Office of Legal Counsel:
Inner Workings and Impact, 19 LAW & COURTS 7, 8 (2009); Randolph D. Moss,
Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A Perspective from the Office of Legal
Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303 (2000). See also John O. McGinnis, Executive
Branch Interpretation of the Law, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 21 (1993) (commenting on
the OLC by past Assistant Attorneys Generals); Frank M. Wozencraft, OLC: The
Unfamiliar Acronym, 57 A.B.A. J. 33 (1971); Symposium, Government Lawyering,
61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. (1998).
20
In affirming the basic assertion of independence of the Office of the
Solicitor General by Solicitor General Francis Biddle in his book, In Brief
Authority, Assistant Attorney General John Harmon informed the Attorney General
that:
[T]he Solicitor General has enjoyed two kinds of independence.
First, he has enjoyed independence within the Department of
Justice. It is he, of all the officers in the Department, who has
been given the task of deciding what the Government’s position
should be in cases presented to the Supreme Court. The views of
subordinate officers within the divisions of the Department are
not binding upon him, and the Attorney General has made it a
practice not to interfere. With respect to his relation to the
Attorney General, we feel constrained to add, however, at the
risk of repetition, that the Solicitor General’s independent role
has resulted from a convenient and necessary division of labor,
not from a separation of powers required by law. Moreover,
Francis Biddle may have overstated the case to some degree.
Under the relevant statutes, as noted, the Attorney General
retains the right to assume the Solicitor General’s function
himself, if he conceives it to be in the public interest to do so.
Secondly, the Solicitor General has enjoyed
independence within the executive branch as a whole. He is not
bound by the views of his “clients.” He may confess error when
he believes they are in error. He may rewrite their briefs. He
may refuse to approve their requests to petition the Court for
writs of certiorari. He may oppose (in whole or in part) the
arguments that they may present to the Court in those instances
where they have independent litigating authority.
....
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General Barr asserted that the dual roles of the Attorney General, a
counselor to the President (both in the political sense and the legal
sense) and an arbiter of legal disputes within the Executive Branch,
do not conflict because “the Attorney General’s ultimate allegiance
must be to the rule of law. In my experience, there has not been any
substantial tension between the role of upholding the rule of law and
the role of the Attorney General as a policy subordinate of the
President.”21
General Barr found that there was no conflict between the
dual roles of the Attorney General because Barr viewed that the
proper question posed to the Attorney General regarding the law will
avoid conflicts. “Much depends on the question that is asked . . .
what is the right answer. [W]hat is the legally right position?”22
General Barr’s point is that the Attorney General should not be
asked, and should not answer, the question “can you advance a
reasonable argument to sustain a given action?”23 Note the
Substantive Considerations. Once the Solicitor General
has taken a position with respect to a pending case, that position
will, in most cases, become the Government’s position as a
matter of course.
Memorandum for the Attorney General: The Role of the Solicitor General, 1 Op.
O.L.C. 228, 230, 234 (Sept. 29, 1977); John M. Harmon, Memorandum Opinion
for the Attorney General—Role of the Solicitor General, 21 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1089
(1988); FRANCIS BIDDLE, IN BRIEF AUTHORITY 97 (1962). See also infra Part IV.
21
Barr, supra note 17, at 34–35.
22
Id. at 35 (emphasis deleted). General Bell similarly explained the
Attorney General’s role in interpreting that law as follows:
The increased complexity of our society and the government's
relationship to it over the past several decades is reflected in the
opinion-giving functions performed by the Attorney General and
his subordinates. Today, the subject matter encompassed by that
function is as broad as the activities of the government itself. It
is not overstatement to say that, in this complex society, the need
for sound legal advice in advance of governmental action has
become particularly acute. There is no substitute for doing
something right the first time.
Griffin B. Bell, The Attorney General: The Federal Government’s Chief Lawyer
and Chief Litigator, or One Among Many?, 46 FORDHAM L. REV. 1049, 1064–65
(1978).
23
Barr, supra note 17, at 35.
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difference. The former question, what is the right position or what is
the right answer, is seeking to know what the law requires or the best
view of the law while the latter question, can you advance an
argument to sustain an action, is trying to get the law to support an
action already taken or desired to be taken. The difference can also
be viewed as that the former is about what the law says while the
latter is a policy determination that is seeking legal support after the
fact. The distinction is not an act of legal sophistry because it is the
difference between the Attorney General acting as nothing more than
a private counsel seeking to justify his clients’ actions versus a quasijudicial officer protecting the law and the rule of law within the
Executive Branch. The difference is cognitive of the distinction
between determining “what is ‘legal’ and what is ‘arguably legal’”
and avoiding “extra-legal biases when interpreting the law.”24 It is
proposed in this article that this cognitive distinction was lost on the
Bush Administration’s OLC during the first two years after 9/11.25
General Barr asserted that the proper question posed to an
Attorney General should be: “[W]hat is the right legal answer—not
whether we can provide a veneer of justification for a given action.”26
General Barr reasoned that:
Ultimately, if you attempt to push too hard—even as a
matter of litigation risks—and take legal positions that
clearly will not be sustained, or that are not
responsible and reasonable legal positions, you will
lose ground . . . . Our view has been that if we go into
court with untenable positions and lose, we ultimately
weaken the office of the President.27
As General Barr correctly observed, the Executive Branch’s legal
assertions of Presidential power that push beyond the accepted
boundaries of the law as understood by the other branches of
government, especially the Judiciary, will result in legal and political
losses. These losses will result in the weakening of the institutional
24

Michael Hatfield, Fear, Legal Indeterminacy and the American
Lawyering Culture, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 511, 511 (2006).
25
See infra Parts III and IV.
26
Barr, supra note 17, at 36.
27
Id.
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powers of the Presidency and the strengthening of the checks on the
Presidency. This result is the opposite of what a President seeks to
achieve. President Truman experienced this loss in the Steel Seizure
Case,28 as did President Bush in the unlawful combatant cases.29
As to advising the President, General Barr made clear that the
Attorney General, while keeping in mind that his ultimate allegiance
was to the rule of law, “the Attorney General, unlike a typical lawyer,
must pay close attention to consistency and precedent, rather than
simply to the immediate interests of his client. This necessary
concern for continuity contributes to the Attorney General’s
resistance to temporary political pressures.”30
General Barr
recognized that the Attorney General is a political subordinate to the
President and that the President has a right to implement political
goals, but that does not mean that the Attorney General must bend
the law to meet those political goals, but rather the Attorney General
must defend the law from the waves of political necessity. General
Barr explained:
Some observers might argue, therefore, that if both
[policy] positions [on a dispute between agencies] are
arguably correct, the Attorney General should, as the
President’s legal advisor, favor the approach most
consistent with the administration’s overall program . .
. . In the context of resolving legal disputes under the
executive order, we reject this view. Furthering the
administration’s policy goals is not our role in giving
legal advice, and it is not our role in resolving
disputes. The question in both contexts is, what is the
right legal answer . . . . Policy disputes are resolved
elsewhere within the executive branch. Any other
arrangement would undermine the Attorney General’s
credibility in rendering legal opinions. Hence, both

28

Youngstown Sheet and Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579 (1952).
Rasul v. Bush, 542 U.S. 466 (2004); Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507
(2004); Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006); Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S.
723 (2008). See also Arthur H. Garrison, National Security and Presidential
Power: Judicial Deference and Establishing Constitutional Boundaries in World
War Two and the Korean War, 39 CUMB. L. REV. 609 (2008-2009).
30
Barr, supra note 17, at 36.
29
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prudence and the President’s delegation of authority
require the Attorney General to consider, when
resolving disputes, not the administration’s policy
objectives, but the rule of law.31
Attorney General Griffin Bell agreed with this approach,
asserting that the interest of the Attorney General is to primarily
provide legal advice and interpret the law, both of which are separate
from political policy making.
[T]he Attorney General is removed from the
policymaking and policy implementation processes of
government, and this is especially true when he deals
with legal questions that arise in the administration of
departments other than his own. It makes sense to
assign the task of making definitive legal judgments to
an officer who is not required, as a general matter, to
play a decisive role in the formulation of policy. Such
an officer enjoys a comparative advantage over
policymakers in the discharge of the lawgiving
function.32
It is this distinction between legal assessment and public policy that
supports the quasi-judicial role of the Attorney General.33
The Barr Doctrine34 is clear regarding the role of the
Attorney General and, by designation, the role of the OLC. The
doctrine’s clarity is apparent within the specific context of legal
interpretation and the protection of the rule of law. It is in this
context that makes the advice of the Attorney General and, by
delegation, the OLC different than the advice provided by other
lawyers within the Executive Branch.35 It is a truism that the

31

Id. at 37.
Bell, supra note 22, at 1068.
33
Garrison, supra note 2.
34
See supra text accompanying notes 17, 21–23, 26–27.
35
Garrison, supra note 2. Steven G. Calabresi asserts that there are three
types of government lawyers: administration legal advocates (political appointees
who assert the legal philosophy of the current administration), court oriented
conservatives (career civil service attorneys who advance legal principles in line
32
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Attorney General and the Assistant Attorney General for the OLC are
political appointees, appointed by the President and confirmed by the
Senate. As such, both officers are selected and confirmed based on
their congruency with the jurisprudential and political ideologies of
the President and, to a lesser degree, the U.S. Senate. It is also a
with judicial precedent), and peacemaking ambassadors (attorneys who represent
the views of administration to the judiciary with the goal of finding common legal
ground between the two branches), and each type has its own role and interests
within the executive branch. Steven G. Calabresi, The President, the Supreme
Court, and the Constitution: A Brief Positive Account of the Role of Government
Lawyers in the Development of Constitutional Law, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
61 (1998). See also Griffin Bell, Office of Attorney General’s Client Relationship,
36 BUS. LAW. 791, 791 (1980–1981) (“But the fact is, if you are on the White
House staff, you are working for the president in a much different sense than if you
hold a confirmed position.”).
Some Attorney Generals have defined their role as being separated from
policy making and protecting the separation between those who make policy and
those involved in litigation within the executive branch. See Bell, supra note 22, at
1069 (“I have played an important role as a buffer between our truly independent
litigating lawyers in the Department of Justice, including the Solicitor General and
his staff, and other government officials outside the Department of Justice.”).
For general histories on the Attorney General and the operation of the
Department of Justice, see JAMES S. EASBY-SMITH, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE:
ITS HISTORY AND FUNCTIONS (1904); HOMER CUMMINGS & CARL MCFARLAND,
FEDERAL JUSTICE: CHAPTERS IN THE HISTORY OF JUSTICE AND THE FEDERAL
EXECUTIVE (1937); ALBERT LANGELUTTIG, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE OF THE
UNITED STATES (1927); Frank Buckley, The Department of Justice: Its Origin,
Development and Present Day Organization, 5 B.U. L. REV. 177 (1925); LUTHER
A. HUSTON, THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE (1967); LUTHER A. HUSTON ET AL.,
ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES (1968); GRIFFIN B.
BELL & RONALD OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW (1982); LINCOLN CAPLAN,
THE TENTH JUSTICE: THE SOLICITOR GENERAL AND THE RULE OF LAW (1987);
CHARLES FRIED, ORDER & LAW: ARGUING THE REAGAN REVOLUTION – A FIRST
HAND ACCOUNT (1991); John O. McGinnis, Principle Versus Politics: The
Solicitor General’s Office in Constitutional and Bureaucratic Theory, 44 STAN. L.
REV. 799 (1992); REBECCA M. SALOKAR, THE SOLICITOR GENERAL: THE POLITICS
OF LAW (1992); CORNELL W. ClAYTON, THE POLITICS OF JUSTICE: THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL AND THE MAKING OF LEGAL POLICY (1992); DOUGLAS W. KMIEC, THE
ATTORNEY GENERAL’S LAWYER: INSIDE THE MEESE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT (1992);
NANCY BAKER, CONFLICTING LOYALTIES: LAW AND POLITICS IN THE ATTORNEY
GENERAL’S OFFICE, 1789-1990 (1992); JIM MCGEE & BRIAN DUFF, MAIN
JUSTICE: THE MEN AND WOMEN WHO ENFORCE THE NATIONS CRIMINAL LAW
AND GUARD ITS LIBERTIES (1996); RAYMOND WOLTERS, RIGHT TURN: WILLIAM
BRADFORD REYNOLDS, THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION AND BLACK CIVIL RIGHTS
(1996).
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truism that the President will choose people with like-minded
ideologies to help shape the operations of the Justice Department36 as
36

For an example of how political ideology governs Justice Department
policy, compare how President Truman’s Attorney General explained the
Administration’s view of criminal justice to those of President Nixon’s Attorney
General:
[W]ritten on the walnut panels that mark the walls, is the phrase:
“The government wins when justice is done.” So long as I am
the Attorney General, that shall be the motto of the Department
of Justice. The government wins whether the defendant is found
guilty or not, so long as he is given a fair trial. The government
wins when justice is done. We represent both sides. As your
Attorney General, I am the people’s lawyer. I am not the lawyer
to prosecute; I am the lawyer to represent all the people.
Tom Clark, The Office of the Attorney General, 19 TENN. L. REV. 150, 155 (1945).
Here we do encounter a basic difference in policy and in
philosophical approach between the present Attorney General
and his predecessor. Attorney General Clark's point of view, as
indicated in Richard Harris’ recent book entitled Justice, appears
to have been that the role of the Department of Justice was
analogous to a European “Ministry of Justice,” where in effect
the Department or Ministry is itself responsible for the end
product that emerges from the administration of the system of
criminal justice.
Attorney General Mitchell, on the other hand, has felt
that the Department of Justice is but one of the several
instrumentalities engaged in the process of administering
criminal justice, and that under our adversary system the role of
the Department is basically that of advocate for the prosecution .
...
I think a very strong case can be made for the fact that a
serious and crippling imbalance in the system of dispensing
criminal justice would result if the Department of Justice
assumed for itself not only the role of prosecutor, but of neutral
referee and ultimate supervisor as to the type of product that is to
emerge from the judicial mill.
....
. . . If the two-party system in this country is to offer the
voters any real choice between programs, it is surely not
unreasonable to expect that there will be some changes in
administration policy when a President of one party succeeds a
President of another.
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a whole and the work of the OLC in particular. The Attorney
General is part of the policy apparatus of a given President. Thus,
the Attorney General is expected to support the political agenda of
the President, when the issues posed to the Attorney General are
political. But when the question posed involves the meaning and
application of the law,37 the Attorney General’s job responsibilities
shift and are no longer driven by the politics of a policy and the
desire to support those policies in implementation. General Bell, in
1980, recounted the relationship between the Attorney General and
the President and the White House staff when legal cases and
determinations of how to handle such cases impacted and conflicted
with the policy goals and objectives of the President. In one case,
Bell decided not to prosecute a case, which President Carter wanted
prosecuted.38 General Bell concluded that the case came too close to
double jeopardy. Needless to say, there were calls for General Bell’s
head. General Bell explained how the situation ended:
But the President got very upset with me because I
would not prosecute the policeman. He thought that
the facts were so bad that we should prosecute it. He
told me that I had embarrassed him by refusing to
prosecute the case.

William W. Rehnquist, The Old Order Changeth: The Department of Justice
Under John Mitchell, 12 ARIZ. L. REV. 251, 255–56 (1970).
Rehnquist, then Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, is correct.
Elections have consequences and the resulting change in ideology from a liberal to
conservative Administration is appropriate and with it changes in overall
Administration policy on interpretation of the law. The only time this should not
be true is when the Attorney General in a particular case advocates a particular
political philosophy and goals contrary to the law or fails to give the best view of
the law to questions posed by the President.
37
General Bell defended the power of the Attorney General to control the
legal arguments made before the Supreme Court in a situation in which President
Carter ordered him to change the governments’ position. General Bell went to see
the President and “told him that we could not ethically change our position on this
unless there had been a change in the law or the facts. I said that I did not
understand who had given him the advice to tell me to do this—but be that as it
may, I simply could not do it, I would be ruined as a lawyer. So he said, ‘Well, just
hold on. I don’t want to ruin you as a lawyer. Just forget about the note I sent
you.’” Bell, supra note 22, at 794.
38
Bell, supra note 35.
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While I was out of the country, some people in the
White House staff asked Ben Civiletti, my deputy, to
reconsider my position. Fortunately, Ben ruled in my
favor. And that is where the matter ended. The
President had a press conference and told the press a
great thing. He said, “I appoint the attorney general.
The prosecutorial discretion is vested in the attorney
general. I can remove the attorney general, but I
cannot tell him who to prosecute, I cannot tell him
who not to prosecute. That is a great thing for this
country.” He said, “I can remove him. That is all I
can do; and I am not prepared to remove the attorney
general on account of this case.” And that is the way
the matter was left.39
39

Id. at 795–96. “I can remove the attorney general, but I cannot tell him
who to prosecute.” Id. The Office of the Attorney General has come a long way
from President Andrew Jackson who, upon receiving an opinion from Attorney
General Rodger Taney that the law did not authorize the President to remove U.S.
funds from the national bank, curtly responded, “Sir, you must find a law
authorizing the act or I will appoint an Attorney General who will.” GRIFFIN B.
BELL & RONALD OSTROW, TAKING CARE OF THE LAW 185 (1982) (quoting L.
HUSTON, A. MILLER, S. KRISLOV & R. DIXON, ROLES OF THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
OF THE UNITED STATES 51 (1968)). General Taney’s opinion feared little better
than Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 30 U.S. 1
(1831), to which President Jackson responded “Mr. Marshall has made his
decision. Now let him enforce it!” See NICHOLAS JOHN CULL, DAVID HOLBROOK
CULBERT, & DAVID WELCH, PROPAGANDA AND MASS PERSUASION: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA, 1500 TO THE PRESENT 4 (2003). Although this statement is
famously attributed to President Jackson, it has been argued that he indeed never
made it. See JOHN ALEXANDER WILLIAMS, APPALACHIA: A HISTORY 403–04
(2002); ROBERT V. REMINI, THE LIFE OF ANDREW JACKSON 216 (1988); and John
Yoo, Andrew Jackson and Presidential Power, 2 CHARLESTON L. REV. 521, 534
(2008).
In another case, General Bell defended the power of the President to
overrule an opinion issued by the Attorney General but also defended the ethical
responsibility of the Attorney General, when the issue involves the appearance of
the government before the judiciary with the revised legal position based on the
President’s decision, to so inform the court that the Attorney General had been
overruled.
So I wrote him and told him that, under the Constitution, he had
every right to overrule me. But, I added, he did not have the
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As there is nothing new under the sun, the story told by
General Bell is similar to the story that takes place a few decades
later during the Bush Administration. When James Comey, Acting
Attorney General, refused to sign the extension of the National
Security Agency Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP), Alberto
Gonzales, the White House Counsel, and Andrew Card, the
President’s Chief of Staff, visited Attorney General John Ashcroft,
while he was in the hospital for emergency surgery, to get him to
overrule the decision by Comey.40 Comey, along with FBI Director
Bob Mueller, Assistant Attorney General Jerry Goldsmith, and
Deputy Assistant Attorney General Patrick Philbin, headed to the
hospital upon learning that Gonzalez and Card were seeking to get
Ashcroft to overrule him. Comey, Philbin, and Goldsmith got to the
hospital first and were sitting with Ashcroft and his wife when
Gonzales and Card arrived with an envelope with a document
authorizing the TSP extension.41 Upon receiving the request to sign
the reauthorization, Ashcroft pulled himself up from his bed and told
the White House delegation that the TSP program was
unconstitutional as constituted, that he would not approve it, and in
any event he was not the Attorney General, Comey was.42 After the
right to control my ethical obligations under rule 11 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, and I would have to make my
own judgment about whether I could support his position in
court. We resolved it by appearing and saying that we appeared
at the direction of the Executive Department.
Bell, supra note 35, at 796.
40
Senate Judiciary Committee, Preserving Prosecutorial Independence: Is
the Department of Justice Politicizing the Hiring and firing of U.S. Attorneys,
Serial No. J-110-14 Testimony by James Comey [hereinafter Comey Testimony],
at 215, 220–21, (May 15, 2007). See Office of Inspectors General, Departments of
Defense, Justice, CIA, NSA, and Office of the Director of National Intelligence,
Unclassified Report on the President’s Surveillance Program (July 10, 2009)
Report No. 2009-0013-AS at 19–30 (July 10, 2009) [hereinafter OIG Report] for
overall discussion of dispute between the White House the Justice department over
the TSP including a timeline of the hospital incident. The OIG Report refers to the
TSP and the President’s Surveillance Program (PSP). See also infra notes 117118.
41
Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 216; See also infra notes 117–118.
42
Id. See also HAROLD H. BRUFF, BAD ADVICE: BUSH LAWYERS IN THE
WAR ON TERROR 152–53 (2009); see infra notes 117–118.
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hospital meeting Card called Comey and ordered him to come to the
White House to discuss the matter, to which Comey said he would
only come if a witness was present and that he would bring Solicitor
General Ted Olsen.
Comey informed Card that the Justice
Department could not provide a legal basis for the TSP program as
currently constituted.43 The TSP program was reauthorized without
Justice Department approval44 by President Bush on March 11th and
Comey, along with Mueller and other key Justice Department
officials including Ashcroft (according to his chief of staff), were
prepared to resign.45 On Friday March 12th, (the day after the

43

Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 217–18.
Id at 218–19.
45
Id. at 219. See also OIG Report, supra note 40, at 27–29; BARTON
GELLMAN, ANGLER: THE CHANEY VICE PRESIDENCY 316 (2006). Comey testified:
44

The program was reauthorized without us, without a signature
from the Department of Justice attesting as to its legality. And I
prepared a letter of resignation intending to resign the next day,
Friday, March the 12th . . . . I believed that I couldn’t—I couldn’t
stay if the administration was going to engage in conduct that the
Department of Justice had said had no legal basis. I just simply
couldn’t stay.
Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 218–19. According to the OIG Report, when
Mueller was made aware of the Department of Justice concerns over the legality of
the TAP, “Vice President Cheney suggested that ‘the President may have to
reauthorize without [the] blessing of DOJ,’” to which Mueller responded, “I could
have a problem with that,” and that the FBI would “have to review legality of
continued participation in the program.” OIG Report, supra note 40, at 22. After
the hospital incident and President Bush signed the reauthorization under his
authority as Commander–in–Chief, Mueller prepared a letter of resignation:
At approximately 1:30 a.m. on March 12, 2004, FBI Director
Mueller drafted by hand a letter stating, in part: “[A]fter
reviewing the plain language of the FISA statute, and the order
issued yesterday by the President . . . and in the absence of
further clarification of the legality of the program from the
Attorney General, I am forced to withdraw the FBI from
participation in the program. Further, should the President order
the continuation of the FBI's participation in the program, and in
the absence of further legal advice from the AG, I would be
constrained to resign as Director of the FBI.” Mueller told the
DOJ OIG that he planned on having the letter typed and then
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Madrid train bombings by an Al Qaeda cell in Spain) the President
met with Comey and later with Mueller. Although Comey in his
testimony before the Senate would not discuss the substance of the
meeting, it is reported that after Comey told the President that in his
opinion the law did not support the TSP, President Bush “told him
sharply, ‘I decide what the law is for the executive branch.’ [To
which] Comey responded, ‘That’s absolutely true, sir, you do. But I
decide what the Justice Department can certify to and can’t certify to,
and despite my absolute best efforts, I simply cannot in the
circumstances.’”46 After the exchange, the President met with
Mueller; and, after meeting with him, Bush retreated and told
Mueller to inform Comey “to do what we believed, what the Justice
Department believed was necessary to put this matter on a footing
where we could certify to its legality. And so we then set out to do
that, and we did that.”47 According to the Office of Inspector
General report on the TSP, Comey decided on March 12th not to

tendering it, but that based on subsequent events his resignation
was not necessary.
Id. at 27. In written responses to Senator Charles Schumer following his
testimony, Comey wrote that he believed that several senior DOJ officials,
including Chuck Rosenberg, Daniel Levin, James Baker, David Ayres, and Deputy
Chief of Staff to the Attorney General David Israelite, were also prepared to resign.
Comey wrote that he believed that “a large portion” of his staff also would have
resigned if he had. Id. at 27 n. 18.
46
BRUFF, supra note 42, at 154 (2009) (citing BARTON GELLMAN,
ANGLER: THE CHANEY VICE PRESIDENCY 318 (2008)). See also HOWARD BALL,
BUSH, THE DETAINEES, AND THE CONSTITUTION: THE BATTLE OVER PRESIDENTIAL
POWER IN THE WAR ON TERROR (2007); see infra notes 117–118.
47
Comey Testimony, supra note 40, at 220, 223–24. Gellman writes that
while Bush and Comey met alone, Comey informed Bush that Mueller was
prepared to resign over the issue, as he was, and that Bush responded in part by
saying he had wished Comey had brought his concerns up before. Gellman writes
that Comey was surprised that Bush had not previously heard of the concerns that
the Justice Department had and that if the President had been told otherwise he had
been badly served by his staff. In any event, Bush, fearing a mass resignation by
Department of Justice staff and respecting (both on a personal and professional
level) the views of FBI Director Mueller, backed down and told Mueller to tell
Comey to make whatever changes were necessary. GELLMAN, supra note 45, at
317–20. See also GRAFF, infra note 117, at 492. Bush revised his March 11
reauthorization to be subject to the approval of the Attorney General and
Department of Justice. OIG Report, supra note 40, at 29.
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order the FBI to discontinue participation with the National Security
Agency (NSA). Subsequently, Goldsmith issued a memo to Comey
stating the President’s determination that the TSP was lawful,
conclusive (due to his constitutional power as Commander-in-Chief
and as the holder of the power to faithfully execute the laws), and
final on the legality of the program as well as binding on the
Executive Branch.48 On March 16th, Comey informed the White
House that the concerns of the Justice Department could not be
rectified with the current operation of the TSP and recommended that
it be discontinued, to which White House Counsel Gonzales
responded:
Your memorandum appears to have been based on a
misunderstanding of the President’s expectations
regarding the conduct of the Department of Justice.
While the President was, and remains, interested in
any thoughts the Department of Justice may have on
alternative ways to achieve effectively the goals of the
activities authorized by the Presidential Authorization
of March 11, 2004, the President has addressed
definitively for the Executive Branch in the
Presidential Authorization the interpretation of the
law.49
Notwithstanding Gonzales letter on March 17th, the President
modified and discontinued the aspects of the TSP that the
Department of Justice determined were legally unsupportable.50
President Bush dedicated two pages to this incident in his
book Decision Points.51 According to the President, when he was
informed that the Justice Department would not reauthorize the TSP,
he asked where Ashcroft was and, upon being informed he was in the
hospital, called Ashcroft and told him he was sending Card and
Gonzales to get his signature. The President writes that when he was
48

OIG Report, supra note 40, at 28.
Id. at 28–29.
50
Id. at 29. According to Gellman, the letter was disavowed by Gonzales
personally. Gellman proposes that the letter was actually the work of David
Addington. GELLMAN, supra note 45, at 321.
51
GEORGE W. BUSH, DECISION POINTS 172–74 (2010).
49
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informed Ashcroft did not sign it he did so himself as head of
Executive Branch. The next day, Card told him that Comey was the
Acting Attorney General and that he and other members of the
Justice Department were going to resign. President Bush writes that
he was surprised and did not know of the dissent within Justice over
the TSP or that Comey was the Acting Attorney General when he
sent Card and Gonzales to the hospital to see Ashcroft. When the
President met with Comey he was informed that the dissent within
the Justice Department was well known to his staff for weeks and
that Comey and Mueller were prepared to resign. President Bush
writes that there were voices within the Executive Branch that
advocated that he stand his ground and reauthorize the TSP over the
Justice Department objections:
I was willing to defend the powers of the Presidency
under Article II. But not at any cost. I thought about
the Saturday Night Massacre in October 1973 . . . .
That was not a historical crisis I was eager to
replicate. It wouldn’t give me much satisfaction to
know I was right on legal principle while my
administration imploded and our key programs in the
War on Terror were exposed in the media firestorm
that would inevitably follow.52
When the President confirmed that Mueller would in fact resign, he
ordered the Justice Department to adjust the program to meet its
concerns.
When the story of the midnight hospital incident (March 10,
2004) came to light it only further added to the contempt that the
Bush Administration had been receiving regarding its post 9/11
policies. Although visiting a sick Attorney General in his hospital
bed, discussing classified policies in an open hospital room in front
of his protesting wife, to get a reversal of a ruling by an Acting
Attorney General is truly pushing well past the envelope, as General
Bell’s story clearly shows it was not unheard of to try to go around an
opinion by an Attorney General once the Attorney General is
temporarily indisposed. As both General Bell and Acting General

52

Id. at 173–74.
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Comey demonstrated, in the context of the law, the Attorney General
is expected to have fidelity to the law and not the mere policy desires
of the President. The distinction between politics and policy versus
the defense and authority of the law is why the daily duties of
defining and defending the law within the Executive Branch have
been delegated from the President to the Attorney General and the
OLC. It is only in the context of defining, defending, and
implementing the law does the Barr Doctrine take hold.
In describing the significance of the OLC, Theodore B. Olsen,
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC from 1981 to 1984 explained
that while “most other government officials have substantive
programmatic responsibilities, the chief responsibility of the head of
OLC is the preservation of the Constitution and the rule of law within
an administration.”53 But more importantly the OLC is looked upon
as “the legal conscience of the Executive Branch” because “a popular
but legally questionable course must be resisted because of legal
standards, the head of OLC is sometimes the first, and almost always
the last, line of resistance.”54 James Comey, in a speech to a meeting
of NSA attorneys,55 reflected the views of Generals Olsen and Barr
regarding conflicts between the law and policy and the role of
government attorneys:
At the outset, we know that we are a nation of laws,
not men.
We have chosen a profession that
internalizes that truth. We know that the rule of law
sets this nation apart and is its foundation. We also
know that we took an oath to support the constitution
of the United States. We know that there may be
agonizing collisions between our duty to protect and
our duty to that constitution and the rule of law.
....
We also know—at the risk of sounding
parochial—that once we give our legal blessing, the
individual policymakers, the operators—good people
53

Theodore B. Olsen, Judge Wilkey and the Office of Legal Counsel, 1985
BYU L. REV. 607, 609 (1985).
54
Id.
55
James Comey, Intelligence Under the Law, 10 GREEN BAG 439, 443
(2007).
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though they may be—won’t be there. In fact, if the
stuff has really hit the fan, we know what will be said:
“We never told the lawyer what to say.” And: “We
simply asked him/her what was permissible.” But we
also know that we won’t be alone in that imaginary
calm, well-lit room—blazingly lit by hindsight. With
us will be the reputation of our great institutions, the
institutions we love because they do so much good
over so many years. We know that damage to the
reputation of that institution will cause harm for years
to come, as our institution recovers from scandal or
allegations of abuse of authority . . . .
The lawyer is the custodian of so much. The
custodian of our own personal reputations, surely. But
more importantly, the custodian of our institutional
reputations.
And most importantly of all, the
custodian of our constitution and the rule of law.
It is the job of a good lawyer to say “yes.” It is
as much the job of a good lawyer to say “no.” “No” is
much, much harder. “No” must be spoken into a
storm of crisis, with loud voices all around, with lives
hanging in the balance. “No” is often the undoing of a
career.
And often, “no” must be spoken in
competition with the voices of other lawyers who do
not have the courage to echo it.
For all those reasons, it takes far more than a
sharp legal mind to say “no” when it matters most. It
takes moral character. It takes an ability to see the
future. It takes an appreciation of the damage that will
flow from an unjustified “yes.”
It takes an
understanding that, in the long-run, intelligence under
law is the only sustainable intelligence in this
country.56
Subservience to the rule of law and the law itself has
consequences to policy and politics, and it is not uncommon for the
law to stand in the way of popular policy determinations. As Comey

56

Id. at 443–44.
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confirms, the rule of law matters when policy is made and political
power is exercised because both have long and short-term political
and institutional consequences. Policy and political power are not
the same; but both, in times of crisis, can oppose the rule of law. The
role of the Attorney General and the OLC is to defend the rule of law
in times of crisis by taking the long-term institutional consequences
into account when dealing with the hot short-term desires of the
Executive Branch. As General Olsen observed, when the law
demands a specific result, “the head of the OLC is [sometimes] a
solitary voice when everyone around him, including those for whom
he works, have powerful reasons for overriding or ignoring his
judgment.”57 In those situations, the OLC only has its institutional
and moral standing to prevail over the powers of politics and policy.
Part of that moral authority rises out of the institutional respect it
commands for producing legal opinions that are unbiased and neutral
in protecting the rule of law and correctly asserting what the law
rules. As General Barr asserted, that is done, in part, by providing
the best view of the law and, as Moss proposes, being a neutral
expositor of the law.58
Randolph D. Moss approached Executive Branch
interpretation of the law from the perspective of the OLC by
advocating the Neutral Expositor model.59
Writing in the
Administrative Law Review while holding the position of Assistant
Attorney General for the OLC in the Clinton Administration, Moss
explained that as a fundamental matter the Executive Branch
perpetually gives meaning to the law because it is responsible for
executing the law, and this fact has significant legal ramifications
because in the vast majority of cases “[E]xecutive [B]ranch
interpretation is not subjected to judicial review [because] at times,
no particular individuals are adversely affected by an [E]xecutive
[B]ranch legal interpretation.”60 It is a truism that all interpretation
of the law involves some level of advocacy. This is true because the
law is seldom so clear and unambiguous that only one possible view
57

Olsen, supra note 53, at 609.
Barr, supra note 17; Comey, supra note 55; Moss, infra note 59.
59
Randolph D. Moss, Executive Branch Legal Interpretation: A
Perspective from the Office of Legal Counsel, 52 ADMIN. L. REV. 1303, 1303
(2000).
60
Id. at 1304.
58
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of the law is available. There is a difference between those attorneys
whose role is to provide the best view of the law regardless of the
policy preferences of the President and those attorneys in the
government who have the responsibility to advocate the meaning of
the law within the confines of whether the view of the law advocated
by the President can be accepted in a court of law. For example, the
Solicitor General approaches the law by determining if a particular
view of the law will find traction with the court. Note that the
question for the Solicitor General is not what is the best view of the
law (a point to be discussed below) but is the view proposed viable.
This approach, the Court Advocacy model, is distinguished from
lawyers who have the responsibility to develop public policy that has
some aspects of law, the Public Legal Policy Advocacy model.61
Public legal policy advocacy operates within the realm of politics.
While Court advocacy focuses on whether a court will find a legal
interpretation viable, public legal policy advocacy focuses on
whether the court of public opinion will find a legal policy viable.62
For example, a President is elected who believes that the death
penalty is constitutional and that the federal government should
support its implementation through appropriate legislation. He
informs the Attorney General to work with Congress to pass
appropriate legislation. The legal issues involved in drafting and
supporting such legislation is public legal policy advocacy. In the
context of court advocacy and public legal policy advocacy, it is not
the role of the Attorney General, the White House General Counsel,
or the staff of the Office of Legal Policy to ask what the best view of
the law is, but to secure the policy that the President supports. In this
example, the law is being made in the political sense, and it is totally
appropriate for the Attorney General and others to make the law or
change the law to suit their needs and desires. Notice that the OLC is
not included in the list of government attorneys who deal in court
advocacy and public legal policy advocacy.63 The OLC addresses

61

Calabresi, supra note 35, at 70, 73; Wendel, infra note 84, at 1341–49;
Harris, infra note 86, at 422–27; Note, infra note 95; Clement, infra note 187.
62
Clement, infra note 187; Lund, infra note 83; Wendel, infra note 84;
Clark, supra note 11.
63
Clement, infra note 187. See also supra notes 61–62 and Douglas W.
Kmiec, OLC’s Opinion Writing Function: The Legal Adhesive for a Unitary
Executive, 15 CARDOZO L. REV. 337 (1993).
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the question that Moss and Barr address, what is the best view of the
law?
Moss explains that, when the context is focused on “the
legality of a proposed Executive Branch action,” the opinion
provided should seek the “best view of the law;” and like “a judge,
the lawyer shuns consideration of his client’s desired policy goals
and acts instead with complete impartiality.”64 In other words under
the Neutral Expositor model when the issue is one regarding the
meaning of the law, the lawyer should:
[S]eek ways to further the legal and policy goals of the
administration [but] do so, however, within the
framework of the best view of the law and, in that
sense should take the obligation neutrally to interpret
the law as seriously as a court. This is particularly so
for the Attorney General, and by delegation, the
Office of Legal Counsel.”65
As discussed above, General Barr came to the same conclusion66 that,
when the question involves the meaning of the law, the role of the
Attorney General and the OLC is to ask “what is the right answer”67
leaving to the Solicitor General the question “can you advance a

64

Moss, supra note 59, at 1305–06.
Id. at 1306.
66
General Barr wrote regarding the interaction between the Constitution
and the rule of law in relation to the role of the Attorney General as follows:
65

The unique position of the Attorney General raises special
considerations. The Attorney General’s oath to uphold the
Constitution raises questions whether his duty lies ultimately
with the President who appointed him or more abstractly with
the rule of law. I said in my confirmation hearings, and have
said several times since, that the Attorney General’s ultimate
allegiance must be to the rule of law . . . . As with any lawyer,
the Attorney General best serves his client by providing
unvarnished, straight-from-the-shoulder legal advice as to what
the attorney General thinks the law is, without regard to political
considerations.”
Barr, supra note 17, at 34–35.
67
Id. at 35.
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reasonable argument to sustain a given action before the courts.”68
Moss explains that there are several reasons why the Attorney
General and the OLC should “strive to find the best view of the law,
rather than to accept (and endorse) any reasonable argument that
promotes the goals and interests of the President.”69
[T]he . . . most compelling reason why the Attorney
General and the Office of Legal Counsel must accept
only the strongest legal arguments is that the
Constitution mandates that the Executive [B]ranch
interpret and apply the law—no less than the courts—
as objectively and accurately as possible.
....
[T]he Framer’s intent to stress the President’s
obligation to perform his duties with a steadfast and
principled adherence to the law. The obligation is not
to execute the law in a reasonable or colorable
manner, but in a faithful manner.70
The Constitution authorizes the President to Take Care that the laws
are faithfully executed and that he is sworn by oath to faithfully
execute the duties of his office to the best of his ability.71 Moss
concludes that when placing these two clauses together a President is
required to “use all of his abilities . . . to ‘preserve’ the
Constitution.”72 Thus, a President who interprets the law and the
Constitution “without regard for its best construction and application,
but rather based on the expediency of the day, could hardly be said to
be preserving the Constitution to the best of his ability.”73
Against this background, the duty of the Executive
Branch lawyer to provide the best, as opposed to a
merely colorable, view of the law to his or her client is
plain . . . . The [E]xecutive [B]ranch has no authority
68

Clement, infra note 187.
Moss, supra note 59, at 1311.
70
Id. at 1312–13.
71
U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3.
72
Moss, supra note 59, at 1315.
73
Id.
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to act beyond the authority provided by the
Constitution or statutes of the United States, and, if
the Constitution and relevant statutes are best
construed to preclude a proposed policy or action, it is
largely irrelevant whether a reasonable argument
might be made in favor of the legality of the proposal
. . . . A reasonable argument might diminish the
political cost of the contemplated action and it might
avoid embarrassment in the courts, but it cannot
provide the authority to act. Only the best view of the
law can do that.74
It is the failure to submit the best view of the law, and not a
reasonable or merely legally viable view of the law in order to meet
the needs of the Bush Administration, which resulted in the errors
within the OLC torture memos.
Professor John O. McGinnis, who served in the OLC as an
Attorney Advisor (1985–1987) and as a Deputy Assistant Attorney
General (1987–1991) in the Reagan and Bush Administrations,
agreed with the traditional views expressed by General Barr along
with Moss and Comey that the role of the Attorney General is to aid
the President in the implementation of his legal responsibilities to
faithfully execute the laws and govern his administration under the
rule of law. Though it is a truism that “the Constitution gives the
President these legal responsibilities, it does not expressly define how
they should be exercised and therefore has left substantial room for
disagreement concerning the Attorney General’s obligation as a legal
advisor and opinion writer.”75 McGinnis provides three models on
the role of the Attorney General in regard to serving the needs of the
President: the Court-Centered model, the Independent Authority
model, and the Situational model.76 The Court-Centered model
proposes that legal advice provided by the Attorney General must
reflect and be limited to judicial precedent.77 The Independent
74

Id. at 1316.
John O. McGinnis, Models of the Opinion Function of the Attorney
General: A Normative, Descriptive, and Historical Prolegomenon, 15 CARDOZO L.
REV. 375, 380 (1993).
76
Id. at 380–81.
77
Id. at 382–84.
75
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Authority model proposes that the Attorney General and the President
should interpret the law as they deem it proper independent of
judicial precedent.78 The Situational model proposes that the
Attorney General and the President should interpret the law in line
with their political goals and policy objectives.79 McGinnis suggests
that the differences between these models, when viewed with “a
more refined analysis” are not as “substantial as might at first
appear.”80
All three models are reflective of the Court Advocacy and
Public Legal Policy advocacy approaches. The Court-Centered
model presupposes that the Attorney General will propose
interpretations of the law that would prevail or at least could prevail
in litigation. As discussed in Part III, this is the approach of the
Solicitor General’s Office, not the OLC. This approach requires that
the legal opinion of the Executive Branch must be in congruence
with legal precedent. Thus, the Attorney General is free to choose
among various reasonable theories of the law that are in line with
court precedent and meet the policy goals of the President. But as
Barr and Moss assert, the point of the legal opinion of the Attorney
General (and the OLC) on what the law requires when advising a
president, the focus of the opinion should not be what can be argued
realistically in court, but what is the best answer (the best view of the
law) to the question presented or policy proposed. The Independent
Authority model and the Situational model are clearly within the
public legal policy advocacy approach. The Independent Authority
model rests upon the idea that the President, co-equal with the
judiciary, has equal authority to determine what the Constitution and
federal statutes mean independent of the Judiciary—the very
argument that General Bates made on behalf of President Lincoln
against the argument of Chief Justice Taney in the Ex parte
Merryman.81 The Situational model rests on the proposition that the
President is elected to implement certain policies and goals, and he is
at liberty to interpret the law in ways that advance the

78

Id. at 389.
Id. at 389–401.
80
McGinnis, supra note 75, at 381.
81
ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN TIME OF
NATIONAL SECURITY, WAR AND TERRORISM: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE (2011).
79
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implementation of those goals and policies. In other words, the
President is at liberty to see the law as a means and not an end.
All three of the models, taken to an extreme, could result in
serious Constitutional conflicts with the two other branches of
government, but historically such views have been tempered by the
practical political nature of governing. As a practical matter, as
observed by past Attorneys General, many of the legal
determinations made by the Attorney General will not be reviewed or
addressed by the judiciary, and as such, he or she will have the ability
to independently determine what the legal answers to those questions
are. In other words, court precedent may be silent on the issue. The
Situational model proposes that the Attorney General is at liberty to
answer legal questions in light of the goals of the President. But as a
practical matter, a President has a Congress, a public press, and the
American people to contend with, each having its own view of what
the law requires. An Attorney General can propose that President
Bush does not need a Congressional resolution to go to war with Iraq
as a legal matter, but the politics of the matter may require him to
seek such a resolution—as it required President Bush to do in
January 1991.82 The problem with all three models is that they make
the law subject to policy and do not seek to meet the values within
the Barr Doctrine or the Neutral Expositor model of providing the
best view of the law. The significance of the rule of law is that it
rules over politics and power, the rule of law is the highest authority.
The Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor models honor and
enforce that final authority; the Court-Centered, the Independent
Authority, and the Situational models at best place policy and politics
on equal footing with the law and at worst, places the rule of law as
subservient with only the counter balancing powers of Congress, the
Judiciary, and public outcry as its protector.
Another approach to the role of the Attorney General in
providing legal advice is the Private Lawyer model. Professor
Nelson Lund, who served as an attorney advisor in the OLC (1986–
1987) in the Reagan Administration and the White House Associate
Counsel to the President (1989–1992) in the first Bush
Administration, describes the Private Lawyer model as requiring the
82

Arthur Garrison, Hamiltonian and Madisonian Democracy, the Rule of
Law and Why the Courts Have a Role in the War on Terror, 8 J. INST. JUST. &
INT’L STUD. 120 (2008).
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Attorney General to provide legal analysis the same way a lawyer in
private practice would.
In private practice, the client sets the objectives and
the lawyer’s function is to help the client understand
the legal constraints and risks that should be weighed
by the client in pursuing those objectives. The quality
of the advice is measured by the degree to which it
enables the client to make fully informed decisions,
and, when the advisor is presented with those
interesting cases that call for “creative lawyering,” by
the lawyer’s success in devising ways to lower the risk
. . . entailed in pursuing the objectives set by the
client.83
Another way to view the Private Lawyer model is in how the
advice is provided. The private lawyer, when asked if a particular
action is legal, will respond from the point of view of whether a court
in hindsight will find the action lawful.84 Government attorneys
applying this model, with the focus being on the ambitions and
policies of their client, i.e., the President, would respond in the form
of approving hesitation—“While I think it’s a stretch to argue that the
AUMF [Authorization for Use of Military Force] supersedes the
warrant requirement in FISA [Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act],
it’s not a ridiculous argument, so if you’re willing to accept the risk
of losing in court, you can go for it.”85 The point being that the
Private Lawyer model accepts that the judiciary will have the final
say as to what the law means, but the private attorney is not bound to
provide the best view of the law. Nor is the attorney bound to
develop legal reasoning as a court would (Court-Centered model) if
it does not serve the political interests of the President. Of course as
a side point, the time between the implementation of a policy with a
facially reasonable legal justification and the final rejection of that
policy by the Supreme Court can be years, and the time difference
83

Nelson Lund, Rational Choice at the Office of the Legal Counsel, 15
CARDOZO L. REV. 437, 448 (1993).
84
See W. Bradley Wendel, Government Lawyers, Democracy, and the
Rule of Law, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 1333 (2009).
85
Id. at 1346.
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alone may serve the political and/or policy interests of the President.
The private lawyer approach is only limited by the requirement that
the legal assertion is made in good faith and as long as it is facially
reasonable, the government attorney proposing it and defending it in
court will not risk sanctions or disbarment.86
The Private Lawyer model derives its context from the
adversarial system. As Professor Wendel explains, the “adversary
system . . . enacts a normative division of labor among various
institutional actors, responding to political needs such as limiting
government power and enhancing accountability”87 and applying the
law to specific circumstances and facts. The goal of the adversarial
system, from the litigant’s point of view, is not establishing the best
view of the law or fidelity to the law over the litigant’s own interests,
but defending a reasonable view of the law in good faith to a neutral
third party against an equally plausible view of the law by one’s
adversary.88 In private litigation, the point is which side can prevail

86
See George C. Harris, The Rule of Law and the War on Terror: The
Professional Responsibilities of Executive Branch Lawyers in the Wake of 9/11, 1
J. NAT’L SEC. L. POL’Y 409, 418 (2005) (“The legal profession’s standards of
conduct offer surprisingly little guidance specifically for lawyers who advise the
government on legal issues”). Although Professor Harris concluded that the OLC
“torture memos” were clearly drafted under the Private Lawyer model and failed to
provide a full view and accounting of the law in order to serve and support the
Bush Administration policy as well as failed to adhere to the classical traditions
(Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor best view of the law approach) of OLC
opinion writing, he could not conclude that the opinions violated ABA professional
rules of conduct. Id. This was the same conclusion reached by Associate Deputy
Attorney General David Margolis who reversed an Office of Professional
Responsibility (OPR) report that concluded that John Yoo and Jay Babee had
engaged in professional misconduct and should be reported to their state bar
associations. See David Margolis, Memorandum for the Attorney General and
Deputy Attorney General: Memorandum of Decision Regarding the Objections to
the Findings of Professional Misconduct in the Office of Professional
Responsibility’s Report of Investigation in the Office of Legal Counsel’s
Memoranda Concerning Issues Relating to the Central Intelligence Agency’s Use
of “Enhanced Interrogation Techniques” on Suspected Terrorists (January 5,
2010) [hereinafter Margolis Opinion].
87
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1347.
88
As Professor Wendel explains, “I have never understood why this
argument from the adversary system is thought to prove anything about legal
advising outside the litigation context.” Id. “Litigation is a special case because
lawyers are permitted to assert the arguable legal entitlements of clients, leaving it
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in court with a facially reasonable argument89 on the applicable law,
not establishing and defending the best view of the law under the
Constitution. It is this normative difference that makes the Private
Lawyer model inapplicable to the roles of the Attorney General and
the OLC when they are tasked with providing legal advice to the
President. It is because the Attorney General and the OLC are
delegated the responsibility to preserve, protect, and defend the law
above policy and politics that both offices are endowed with quasijudicial power within the Executive Branch to determine the meaning
of the law.
Professor Lund correctly observes that in the absence of the
client’s interests as the central motivator of the Attorney General’s
advice, the process of the Attorney General in legal opinion writing
will become quasi-judicial.90 Although he is correct, he is wrong as
to why. The reason is not that “removing the constraint of serving a
client’s interest [will] leave him free either to enjoy the intellectual
pleasure of expressing uninhibitedly his own opinion of what the law
is or to promote other interests of his own;”91 but, the removal of the
political interests of the President in lieu of the interest and dictates
of the law will result in making the Attorney General a neutral
expositor of law in line with the Barr Doctrine. To paraphrase Chief
Justice John Marshall, when the Attorney General gives an opinion
on the meaning of the law, he or she must remember it is the law he
or she is espousing. Legal ethics that govern private attorneys make
clear that their role is to serve the purposes and goals of the client,
not the best view of the law or the law itself. They are required,
under the pain of sanction or disbarment, to serve the client without

up to the workings of the adversary system to evaluate whether the lawyer’s
position is plausible.” Id. at 1348.
89
Professor Wendel might assert that I am overstating the looseness that
private litigators can engage in regarding the assertion of a particular view of the
law on behalf of their clients because lawyers cannot assert views of the law that
are not grounded in established law, they are obligated to site governing law even if
the opposing counsel fails to disclose such law, and can be sanctioned for
overreaching or stretching the applicability of the law in their arguments. Id. All
true and conceded, but the point is not that private attorneys are without limits, but
government attorneys—the Attorney General and the OLC—have a higher
minimum standard than private attorneys in litigation.
90
Lund, supra note 83, at 441.
91
Id. at 447.
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clearly breaking the law. The private attorney has, and is required to
have, fidelity to his client and the interest of his client, not to the
law.92 While private attorneys are not required to seek, serve,
protect, and assert the best view of the law, the Attorney General and
the President are required to do so by both their oaths and statutory
law to preserve, protect, and defend the Constitution93 above their
political policy interests. The relationship between the Attorney
General and the President, when the meaning of the law is concerned,
is to place the Constitution and the law above policy and politics.
This is why the Private Lawyer model is inapplicable, both because
the Attorney General is not any private lawyer serving his clients

92

For a contrary view on the ethical normative aspects of the
responsibility of the private lawyer, Attorney General Michael Mukasey, in an
address to the graduates of Boston Law School in 2008, stated that:
If the lawyer’s best reading of the law permits some policy, he
has a professional obligation to say that it would be lawful—even
if he personally disagrees with it, or recognizes that it may one
day prove politically controversial. Just as important—perhaps
more important—if the lawyer believes that some policy would
be unlawful, he has a professional and ethical obligation to say
no—even if some people think that the policy is critical. The
rule of law, and the oath every public servant takes to support
and defend the Constitution, depend on it.
. . . The lawyer in private practice must not confuse his
client’s interest with the law; he has an obligation to say no if no
is the right answer, even if the client doesn't want to hear it. The
lawyer pursuing what he believes to be the public interest must
not confuse personal views on what the law ought to be for what
the law is . . . .
In becoming lawyers, you are becoming the custodians
of a trust—a trust whose assets are the rule of law and the justice
that results from that rule of law. Being a custodian of that trust
carries with it solemn responsibilities . . . .
Michael Mukasey, The Role of Lawyers in the Global War on Terrorism, 32 B.C.
INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 179, 185 (2009).
93
The Constitution requires the President to preserve, protect, and defend
the Constitution and faithfully to the best of his ability execute the office of
President which includes the responsibility to take care that the laws, not political
policies, are faithfully executed. U.S. CONST. art. II, §§ 1, 3. The Attorney
General’s oath obligates him to “support and defend the Constitution” and to “bear
true faith and allegiance to the same.” 5 U.S.C. § 3331 (1988).

682

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

personal goals and ambitions and the President is not any client who
seeks legal advice to serve his own desires.94 Both seek the other in
the service of the law and the Constitution. It is this understanding
that provides the Attorney General and the OLC the power and
responsibility to act quasi-judicially when providing opinions on the
meaning of the law—because it is the law that is being espoused.
The public application of the Private Lawyer model is the
Agency Loyalty model, which focuses on the government attorney’s
duty and loyalty to the agency that employs him, and that relationship
applies the same legal and ethical responsibilities that govern the
private lawyer.95 Thus, the role of the government lawyer under the
Agency Loyalty model is to serve the interests and goals of the
agency just as a private attorney would serve the interests of his
client. As one commentator observed:
Of course it should be remembered that while the
government lawyer is part of the agency, the
government lawyer is not the agency. Thus, the
lawyer does not bear full responsibility for the
agency’s final outcome; rather, the lawyer bears

94

The Private Lawyer model fails for another normative reason. The
model raises the question of what is the client’s purpose for asking the attorney’s
advice.
[O]ne who contends that a government lawyer need provide only a
colorable legal basis for a proposed course of action has the burden to
explain why a lawyer, seeking to ascertain whether a client has a legal
entitlement to do something, should be content to get the answer only
approximately right . . . . In the legal counseling context, the reason clients
seek merely colorable advice is that they are interested in getting away
with something that is not a genuine legal right.
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1348. In a counseling context, the best view of the law
involves the assessment of what “the client’s right probably is, and what the
client’s right likely is not.” Id. The point being in the Private Lawyer model
counseling context “a lawyer’s job is to find the limits of the client’s legal
entitlements, because the client is only permitted to act with legal authorization.”
Id. at 1349. Such is the minimum that is required with private parties.
95
Note, Rethinking the Professional Responsibilities of Federal Agency
Lawyers, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1170 (2002).
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responsibility for faithfully fulfilling her role in the
process.96
The Agency Loyalty model could be considered as a mode for the
Barr Doctrine or the Neutral Expositor model if it is the goal that the
agency (the OLC for our purposes) is to provide the best view of the
law to the President and cabinet officers regardless of their individual
desire to have the law support their initiatives. The role of attorneys
within the OLC is not to make policy choices for the Department of
Justice or the President but to provide a neutral best view of the
law.97 The Agency Loyalty model can facilitate this result when the
work of the OLC includes the goal of not proposing, as the Bush
Administration OLC did, politically useful general constitutional
views of executive power to serve the perceived national security
needs of the nation after 9/11. The faithful fulfilling of his or her role
in the OLC process is to present the best view of the law, not the
most policy congruent, legally plausible view of the law.
During the first two years after 9/11, John Yoo and others
within the administration adopted, supported, and implemented a
strong version of the Private Lawyer model in which it was assumed
that the “Justice Department and specifically OLC serve in part as the
lawyers for the executive branch.98 [And it] exists to interpret the
Constitution and federal law for the executive branch”99 in that order
and for that purpose. As Jack Goldsmith, former Assistant Attorney
General for the OLC, wrote in The Terror Presidency:
Especially on national security matters, I would work
hard to find a way for the President to achieve his
ends. Whenever I advised the White House that a
proposed action was legally problematic, I would try
to suggest ways to achieve its goals through
alternative and legally available means.
. . . Legal advice to the President from the
Department of Justice is neither like advice from a
private attorney nor like a politically neutral ruling
96

Id. at 1181.
See supra notes 17, 55, 59, 61–63 and accompanying text.
98
JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS 186 (2006).
99
Id. at 19.
97
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from a court.
It is something inevitably, and
uncomfortably, in between.
OLC also needn’t look at legal problems the
way courts do. Most Americans (including most
lawyers) think the law is what courts say it is, and they
implicitly equate legal interpretation with judicial
interpretation. But the executive branch does not have
the same institutional constraints as courts, especially
on national security issues where the President’s
superior
information
and
quite
different
responsibilities foster a unique perspective.100
Goldsmith was even more candid when he concluded that “[his] job
was to make sure the President could act right up to the chalk line of
legality.”101 Although he wrote that he was in agreement with the
Barr Doctrine,102 he also wrote candidly that the goal of OLC
opinion writing during the initial post 9/11 years was to provide:
[T]he legal cover needed to overcome law-induced
bureaucratic risk-aversion . . . [and the] OLC would
have been of little help to the Bush II White House
without someone in the office willing and able to
write clear and forceful opinions supporting the
President’s aggressive counterterrorism program. By
an accident of fate, . . . John Yoo—was sitting in OLC
on September 11.103
As Goldsmith later explained to a conference hosted by the
Army Judge Advocate General School, when he began his tenure at
the OLC he, thought that the issue of how to advise the Executive

100

JACK GOLDSMITH, THE TERROR PRESIDENCY: LAW AND JUDGMENT
INSIDE THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION 35 (2007) (emphasis added).
101
Id. at 78.
102
Id. at 33–34.
103
Id. at 96–97.
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Branch was “a simple matter.”104 In describing his view of the OLC
and his role as head of the OLC:
I testified to this effect at my confirmation hearings—
that I was simply going to provide good faith,
impartial legal advice. I was influenced by one of my
predecessors, William Barr . . . . This was my attitude
going in, and I think it’s a good attitude to have going
in. But as soon as I got there, I realized this attitude
was too simple.105
Goldsmith asserted that the government lawyer’s advice to the
President is political.
This doesn’t mean that you’re supposed to be
political, and it doesn’t mean you can be an advocate
in the same sense that you would if you were a private
attorney advising a client. Rather, it means that the
lawyer is a member of an Executive Branch and is not
neutral to the President’s or to the commander’s
agenda when advising him or her on a legal matter.
Unlike a court that often just says “no” or “yes,” I
never said “no” to any of my superiors without trying
to find a way to help them find a way to achieve their
desired ends within the law.106
Goldsmith found agreement with John Yoo that the role of the OLC,
not differing from the role of any executive branch attorney, is to
provide the Executive Branch with a legal avenue to achieve its
desired goals. According to Goldsmith, the President should be
given every legal benefit of the doubt as to the law when addressing a
legal policy posed by him;107 and, in regard to counterterrorism
policy after September 11th, the “President had to do what he had to
104

Jack Goldsmith, The Third Annual Solf-Warren Lecture in
International and Operational Law: Reflections on Government Lawyering, 205
MIL. L. REV. 192, 195 (2010).
105
Id.
106
Id. at 196.
107
Id.
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do to protect the country. And the lawyers had to find some way to
make what he did legal.”108
Another way to view the debate on the role of government
attorneys in providing legal advice is the public choice versus public
interest approaches. Public choice is a type of rational choice law
and economics’ theory. The rational choice theory views human
interactions in economic terms meaning that in a world of scarce
resources in which there is not enough for all to share to each
person’s satisfaction, all those interested in securing a scarce resource
will maximize his or her accumulation of the resource to the
detriment of others if necessary.109 Public choice theory, as applied
to our discussion proposes that the “President competes with other
branches of government, and other actors within the executive
branch, over the scarce good of determining government policy. A
lawyer, as the faithful agent of her client, seeks to advance her
client’s interests through any lawful means.”110 The scarce good is
the power and ability to control government policy-making. The
Private Lawyer model is one example of the public choice theory
because the focus is not on the law but on maximizing the client’s
achievement of a scarce resource short of illegal activity. As
Professor Wendel observed:
[T]he public choice approach . . . denies that lawyers
can have any genuine obligation of fidelity to law . . . .
If it is possible to act lawlessly and get away with it,
lawyers have no duty to advise their client against that
course of action and, indeed, if it is in the client’s
interests, the lawyer may have a duty to assist the
client.111

108

GOLDSMITH, supra note 100, at 81 (emphasis added).
For example, see DONALD P. GREEN & IAN SHAPIRO, PATHOLOGIES OF
RATIONAL CHOICE THEORY (1994). For examples of the application of rational
choice theory to law, see Richard A. Posner, Economics, Politics, and the Reading
of Statutes and the Constitution, 49 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (1982) and David Cole,
The Poverty of Posner’s Pragmatism: Balancing Away Liberty After 9/11, 59
STAN. L. REV. 1735 (2007).
110
Wendel, supra note 84, at 1341.
111
Id. at 1349.
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. . . [T]hat the lawyer’s role is primarily to be
understood with reference to client interests, with the
law understood as nothing more than an obstacle
standing in the way of their clients’ ends.112
Although it could be argued that Professor Wendel may be
overstating his point, he is correct that, under the Public Choice
model, the best view of the law is not a scarce resource maximizing
approach. In contrast, the Public Interest model does provide a
framework for applying the Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor
model.
In Shakespeare’s famous play Henry VI, Dick the Butcher
responds to Jack Cade’s ideal—to provide for all of the needs of the
people, relieving them of the need for money, so they can live in
perfect harmony—with the famous phrase, “[t]he first thing we do,
let’s kill all the lawyers.”113 Leaving aside whether this famous
quote is a joke—that to have a peaceful and happy society, the first
group that must go is the legal profession or, alternatively, a subtle
warning that before establishing a societal utopia (an imposed
uniform equality—as determined by the king—among all in which
individuality is abandoned) one must destroy the legal profession
which protects individualism and uses the law to shield society from
the raw power of government, either observation is a comment on the
role of attorneys and whose interests they serve—those of the
individual or those of society as a whole.114 The latter raises the
112

Id. at 1350.
WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, THE SECOND PART OF KING HENRY THE
SIXTH act 2, sc. 2.
114
The idea that the attorney has an obligation to serve society as a whole
and the interests of society was famously advocated by Charles Huston, Vice-Dean
of the Howard Law School, who is often quoted as saying to his students:
113

A lawyer’s either a social engineer or he’s a parasite on society
. . . A social engineer [is] a highly skilled, perceptive, sensitive
lawyer who [understands] the Constitution of the United States
and [knows] how to explore its uses in the solving of [the]
problems of . . . local communities and in ‘bettering conditions of
the underprivileged citizens.’
ABOUT THE SCHOOL OF LAW, HOWARD UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,
http://www.law.howard.edu/19 (last visited Nov. 14, 2012). See also GENNA RAE

688

Journal of the National Association of Administrative Law Judiciary

32-2

question: should an attorney serve the public interest above the
interests of his or her client, or in the case of government attorneys
(or the OLC), those interests of the President? This is not an
academic or philosophical issue for a debate class, it matters what
those in power think the rule of law means in practical application in
times of stress and political pressure.115 During the Justice
MCNEIL, GROUNDWORK: CHARLES HAMILTON HOUSTON AND THE STRUGGLE FOR
CIVIL RIGHTS 84 (1983). See also; Charles Hamilton Houston: Legal Social
Engineer for a Just Society, INFO OF ARTIST BIOGRAPHY (Aug. 1, 2010, 12:42 PM),
http://american-biography.blogspot.com/2010/08/charles-hamilton-houston-legalsocial.html.
115
Intestinal fortitude matters in government when one must stand for
something. After the midnight confrontation between the White House attorneys
and the Department of Justice attorneys in Ashcroft’s room, in which Ashcroft had
stared down the White House staff (suffering from gallstone pancreatitis) almost
flat on his back and sending them back without his signature, a beleaguered
Ashcroft looked at Mueller and said, “Bob, I don’t know what’s happening,” and
Mueller looked at him and said, “There comes a time in every man’s life when he’s
tested, and you passed your test tonight.” GRAFF, infra note 117, at 488.
In a meeting a day before the midnight hospital incident, Comey attended
a meeting with V.P. Cheney, White House Chief of Staff Andy Card, Goldsmith
(head of the OLC), and Deputy Assistant Attorney General (OLC) Patrick Philbin
to get a briefing from the FBI and National Security Agency on the TSP program in
which the message to the Department of Justice holdouts was “If the program
didn’t continue, thousands would die, and it would be Jim Comey’s fault.” Id. at
486. To which Comey told the room, “That’s not helping me” and when he made
clear that the Yoo memo “analysis is flawed – in fact, fatally flawed. No lawyer
reading that could reasonably rely on it” the General Counsel to the Vice President
David Addington said “well, I’m a lawyer and I did.” To which Comey answered
the challenge and said “No good lawyer.” Id.
The memo that Comey referred to was the November 2, 2001 memo that
Yoo submitted to the Attorney General. In the heavily redacted publically released
version, Yoo asserted that “FISA only provides a safe harbor for electronic
surveillance, and cannot restrict the President's ability to engage in warrantless
searches that protect the national security” and although “FISA purports to be the
exclusive statutory means for conducting electronic surveillance for foreign
intelligence . . . . Such a reading of FISA would be an unconstitutional
infringement on the President’s Article II authorities.” Yoo concluded that “unless
Congress made a clear statement in FISA that it sought to restrict presidential
authority to conduct warrantless searches in the national security area—which it
has not—then the statute must not be construed to avoid such a reading.” Yoo then
asserted that Congress could not place such a restriction on the Article II power of
the Commander-in-Chief; and, when the president orders such searches in the name
of national security, he has plenary power to do so because “intelligence gathering
in direct support of military operations does not trigger constitutional rights against
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Department dispute with the White House over the TSP program, the
conflict was not whether the program was a good program or useful
program; it was a conflict over its legality.116 During the conflict,
FBI Director Bob Mueller played a significant role in settling the
dispute with the White House acceding to the Justice Department’s
concerns for the illegality of the program.117 Mueller approached the
dispute by backing Comey and making it clear that his role, as
director of the FBI, is “to uphold the Justice Department’s
responsibility for protecting the Constitution” because he “hadn’t
sworn to serve George W. Bush, [but] he had sworn to protect the
Constitution from all enemies, foreign and domestic.”118
The Public Interest and the Agency Loyalty models were both
utilized when the entire senior leadership of the Department of
Justice, including Ashcroft and Mueller, were prepared to resign119
illegal searches and seizures.” Yoo asserted that the fourth amendment protection
against warrantless searches was not absolute, and “a warrantless search can be
constitutional when special needs, beyond the normal need of law enforcement,
make the warrant and probable-cause requirement impractical.” John Yoo,
Memorandum
to
the
Attorney
General
(November
2,
2001)
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/NSA_Wiretapping_OLC_Memo_Nov_2_2001_Yo
o.pdf.
On May 6, 2004 Goldsmith issued a memo to the Attorney General
asserting that “the President, as Commander in Chief and Chief Executive, has
legal authority to authorize the NSA to conduct the signals-intelligence activities
described above; that the activities, to the extent they are searches subject to the
Fourth Amendment, comport with the requirements of the Fourth Amendment; and
thus that the operation of the [TSP] program as described above is lawful.” Jack
Goldsmith, Memorandum to the Attorney General (May 6, 2004), at 108
http://www.aclu.org/files/assets/NSA_Wiretapping_OLC_Memo_May_6_2004_G
oldsmith.pdf.
Both memos were withdrawn by the OLC. See Steven Bradbury,
Memorandum for Files: Re: Status of Certain OLC Opinions Issued in the
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks of September 11, 2001 (January 15, 2009) at 6,
available at
http://www.justice.gov/opa/documents/memostatusolcopinions01152009.pdf.
116
See supra notes 40–52; GRAFF, infra note 117. When President Bush
met with Mueller two days after the midnight hospital incident, “Mueller refused to
budge from his position. The Stellar Wind program [TSP] as instituted was illegal.
Simple as that.” Id. at 493.
117
GARRETT M. GRAFF, THE THREAT MATRIX: THE FBI AT WAR IN THE
AGE OF GLOBAL TERROR 490–91 (2011).
118
Id. at 491 and 493 respectively.
119
Id. at 489; supra notes 40–52.
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when the President signed the reauthorization of a program that had
been determined to be illegal. Ashcroft and Comey had determined
after a meeting on March 4, 2004 that to do otherwise would expose
the Department to “tremendous dangers” by making it “knowingly
complicit in active lawbreaking. Given the Department’s—and the
FBI’s—mandate, to do so would constitute a fundamental sort of
corruption.”120 The Agency Loyalty model allowed for the entire
senior leadership of the Department of Justice to threaten resignation
because the role of their agency, protection of the rule of law, was
directly attacked and they were bound to defend their agency; and the
Public Interest model allowed them to act because the higher public
interest was the law, not the administration’s policy. As Director
Mueller stated in a speech before the American Civil Liberties Union
on June 13, 2003, less than a year before the dispute came to a
climax,
[t]he FBI puts a premium on thoroughly training our
Special Agents about their responsibility to respect the
rights and dignity of individuals. In addition to
extensive instruction on Constitutional law, criminal
procedure, and sensitivity to other cultures, every new
FBI Agent makes a visit to the Holocaust museum to
see for themselves what happens when law
enforcement becomes a tool for oppression.
We live in dangerous times, but we are not the
first generation of Americans to face threats to our
security. Like those before us, we will be judged by
future generations on how we react to this crisis. And
by that I mean not just whether we win the war on
terrorism, because I believe we will, but also whether,
as we fight that war, we safeguard for our citizens the
very liberties for which we are fighting.
...

120

GRAFF, supra note 117, at 485. The Administration lead by President
Bush and Vice President Cheney viewed the program differently than the Justice
Department in that “the administration viewed the surveillance program as a
necessity for the nation’s security; Mueller felt just the opposite: The nation’s
security rested with its primacy of law . . . . If President Bush didn’t change course,
Mueller had no choice, he said.” Id. at 493.

Fall 2012

The Role of the OLC After September 11th

691

. . . the FBI will live up to its obligation to protect the
citizens of the United States as well as the rights
afforded to each citizen under our Constitution . . . .
. . . But in fighting terrorists, we seek to prevent the
“tyranny of the minority” from destroying our
fundamental way of life. The FBI will be judged not
just on how we effectively disrupt and deter terrorism,
but also on how we protect the civil liberties and the
Constitutional rights of all Americans, including those
who wish us ill. We must accomplish both, so that
future generations can enjoy lives that are both “safe”
and “free.” The FBI is dedicated to protecting
Americans, and America’s freedoms, and we will.121
The Public Interest model is an alternative to the Private
Lawyer model by emphasizing that the role of the attorney, in
general, and (for the present discussion) the role of the Attorney
General and the OLC, is to serve the public good or, at the very least,
the interests of the institution of the Presidency and the national
government, not the specific individual holding the Office of the
Presidency.122 As General Bell observed in his remarks regarding the
role of government attorneys: “Although our client is the
government, in the end we serve a more important constituency: the
American people.”123 The Public Interest model requires the
Attorney General and the OLC to answer a President’s request for the
interpretation of the law with the best view of the law, not with the
answer the President would like to receive, because the interests of
the Attorney General and the OLC are institutional not individual.124
It is granted that, even under this rubric, the most honest lawyers
would disagree on the resolution of specific legal questions, but the
point is that the goal under the Public Interest model is functionally
and normatively different than the Private Lawyer model in which
121

Robert Mueller, Address to the American Civil Liberties Union 2003
Inaugural Membership Conference Washington, DC (June 13, 2003),
http://www.fbi.gov/news/speeches/protecting-americans-against-terrorism.
122
See supra notes 17, 53, 55, 59–63 and accompanying text.
123
Bell, supra note 22, at 1069.
124
See supra notes 17, 53, 55, 59–63 and accompanying text.
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the goal to be reached is the one held by the client. The Public
Interest model is not defined by the specific legal conclusions
reached but by the process and goal of focusing on the law above
politics; for doing so maintains the elevation of the principle of the
rule of law over the rule by law.125
The Public Interest model approach was advocated by Dawn
Johnsen, Acting Assistant Attorney General for the OLC (1997–
1998)126 and OLC Deputy Assistant Attorney General in the Clinton
Administration (1993–1996), in a memo addressed to Attorney
General Ashcroft, Alberto Gonzalez (White House Counsel) and
Daniel Levin (Acting Assistant Attorney General for OLC) on
December 21, 2004 after the OLC August 2002 Memo on
interrogation had been released.127 The memo listed ten guiding
principles on OLC legal opinion writing. The first principle correctly
rejected the Private Lawyer model and supported the Barr Doctrine
and Neutral Expositor model for providing opinions to the
President.128 It is not contended that the memo does not reflect a
political agenda of the signors of the document129 or bias against the

125

Id. See also Garrison, supra note 82.
Ms. Johnsen was nominated to be the Assistant Attorney General for
the OLC by President Obama in January 2009 and, although being positively
reported out of the Senate Judiciary Committee in March 2009, her nomination
received significant Republican opposition due to her positions on abortion and the
Bush post-September 11th policies which resulted in failure to schedule a final
Senate vote. Johnsen withdrew her nomination in April 2010.
127
Dawn E. Johnsen, Faithfully Executing the Laws: Internal Legal
Constraints on Executive Power, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1559 (2007).
128
Id. at 1604.
126

When providing legal advice to guide contemplated executive
branch action, OLC should provide an accurate and honest
appraisal of applicable law, even if that advice will constrain the
administration’s pursuit of desired policies. The advocacy model
of lawyering, in which lawyers craft merely plausible legal
arguments to support their clients’ desired actions, inadequately
promotes the President’s constitutional obligation to ensure the
legality of executive action.
Id. (italics removed).
129
All of the signatories were members of the OLC during the Clinton
Administration.
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work of the Bush Administration OLC,130 but that the memo is
correct that the OLC opinions should reflect the best view of the law
and should be provided with the fidelity to the law and not primarily
to the interests of the President.
A final approach to how government attorneys should
approach legal advising is called the Critical Analysis model.131 This
approach supplements the Public Interest model by observing that
attorneys have significant input in policy determinations and strategic
planning by the nature of the fact that government agencies seek to
act within the law.132 Thus, the best view of the law, reflecting the
public interest values of the rule of law prevailing over policy when
the two are in conflict, is implemented by the process in which “the
government lawyer draws on the numerous sources from which the
public interest can be extrapolated to help the agency define its
position in light of those values.”133
The role of opinion writing first established by the Attorney
General and then transferred to the OLC is not equivalent to the role
of the private lawyer providing advice to his client. The OLC has a
public interest to protect, which private and other government
attorneys do not share. The history of legal opinion writing within
the Executive Branch has a higher purpose than simply securing an

130

For example, after providing the first principle, the memo explains as

follows:
To fulfill this function appropriately, OLC must provide advice
based on its best understanding of what the law requires. OLC
should not simply provide an advocate’s best defense of
contemplated action that OLC actually believes is best viewed as
unlawful. To do so would deprive the President and other
executive branch decisionmakers of critical information and,
worse, mislead them regarding the legality of contemplated
action.
Id. Notice the assumption in the second sentence that “OLC should not simply
provide an advocate’s best defense of contemplated action that OLC actually
believes is best viewed as unlawful,” clearly implying that OLC knew the advice
that Yoo and Barbee provided was unlawful but decided to provide the
administration with its best argument on how to sustain an “unlawful” act.
131
Note, supra note 95, at 1182.
132
Id. at 1176.
133
Id. at 1186.
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answer to a legal question. The purpose is to aid the Office of the
President to faithfully execute the laws.134 This responsibility can be
implemented through various models on the role of government
attorneys. The Barr Doctrine and the Neutral Expositor models
provide a context for the Public Interest and the Critical Analysis
models; all of which provide a framework for reaching the same
objective, the rule of law over politics and policy. The institution of
legal opinion writing under the authority of the Attorney General is
separate and above the role as cabinet officer and political
subordinate to the President. The Barr Doctrine, the Neutral
Expositor model, the Public Interest model, and the Critical Analysis
model applied to executive legal opinion writing protect the principle
of the rule of law and the OLC obligation to get correct what the law
rules. It is when the OLC abandons this role for that of the private
lawyer or policy advocate that errors are made.
III. THE BUSH ADMINISTRATION, THE OLC, THE JAGS AND THE WAR
ON TERROR: WHERE POLICY AND LAW INTERACTED
Lord Young: We were showing that
this is not a state where the rule of law
counts for nothing, and where a
member of the security services can
appoint themself as an executioner.
Harry: Well, I hope you remember that
pious bullshit the next time there’s a
terrorist outrage on these shores.
Lord Young: I hope you remember that
a democracy is not only protected with
guns.135
It is a truism that a democracy is not only protected by guns,
but is protected even more by the rule of law and what the rule of law
protects. Not since the attacks of December 7, 1941 had the United
States suffered a major attack on its shores, and in the very first
134

Garrison, supra note 2; Barr, supra note 17; Comey, supra note 55;
Moss, supra note 59.
135
BBC TV Series MI-5 Persephone Season 3, Episode 6 (November 15,
2004), available at http://www.tv.com/shows/spooks-uk/episode-6-375582/.
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national security meeting after the attacks of 9/11, General Ashcroft
summarized a key policy determination by the Bush
Administration—that the goal was to make sure they never happen
again.136 The Bush Administration approached the attacks with two
policy determinations: first, that they were acts of war and not
international criminal acts;137 and second, it was the policy of the
national government, law enforcement, and intelligence institutions
to prevent a second occurrence of the attacks.138 One of the resulting
policy initiatives was the determination that the administration would
not approach the capturing of those who participated and planned the
136

JOHN ASHCROFT, NEVER AGAIN: SECURING AMERICA AND RESTORING
JUSTICE 133 (2006).
137
President Bush in his State of the Union Address on January 20, 2004
made clear:
As we gather tonight, hundreds of thousands of
American service men and women are deployed across the world
in the war on terror. By bringing hope to the oppressed and
delivering justice to the violent, they are making America more
secure.
....
America is on the offensive against the terrorists who
started this war. . . .
....
Many of our troops are listening tonight. And I want
you and your families to know: America is proud of you. And
my administration and this Congress will give you the resources
you need to fight and win the war on terror.
....
I know that some people question if America is really in
a war at all. They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to
be solved mainly with law enforcement and indictments.
....
After the chaos and carnage of September the 11th, it is
not enough to serve our enemies with legal papers. The terrorists
and their supporters declared war on the United States. And war
is what they got.
Text of President Bush’s 2004 State of the Union Address, WASH. POST (Jan. 20,
2004),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/transcripts/bushtext_012004.html
[hereinafter State of the Union Address].
138
ASHCROFT, supra note 136; YOO, supra note 98; Mueller, supra note
121.
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attacks with a law enforcement perspective—i.e. by bringing them
before the bar of justice—but the purpose of capture was
interrogating and gathering actionable intelligence to prevent future
attacks.139 There is a difference between the gathering of evidence
for trial and the gathering of intelligence in war, and the differences
in purpose and techniques between them are legitimate but are almost
always mutually exclusive. General Ashcroft made this clear when
he said at the first national security meeting that if we don’t go to
trial, so be it.140
The initial problem with the Bush policy after 9/11 was that
the nation, as a whole, was not totally convinced that the attacks were
acts of war and should be handled as such.141 But more importantly,
the problem that the Bush Administration created for itself was that,
after declaring that the attacks were acts of war and would be treated
as such, it determined that the rules of war—as understood by the
international, academic, and uniformed armed forces’ legal
communities—did not apply.142 If the attackers of 9/11, and those
who helped in the planning and operation of it, had committed war,
how could they be detained and questioned (interrogated) outside of
the Geneva Convention and its protections? The answer to this
question is not insignificant because, since the end of World War II,
the nature of war has changed to include the reduction of civilian
casualties as a primary military and legal obligation of all nations.
More importantly, with the advent of international treaties, the
international human rights movement (and supporting organizations)
and international judicial bodies designed to govern the dogs of war
and enforce the role of the law in the operational aspect of war have
become significant aspects of planning by line military officers. This
application of law as a part of warfare has come to be called
“lawfare;” and, in the U.S. military, lawfare has resulted in the
increased significance of the armed forces’ Judge Advocates General

139

ASHCROFT, supra note 136.
Id. at 133.
141
President Bush acknowledged as much in his 2004 State of the Union
Address: “I know that some people question if America is really in a war at all.
They view terrorism more as a crime, a problem to be solved mainly with law
enforcement and indictments.” See State of the Union Address, supra note 137.
142
See supra notes 3, 7–10 and infra Part III.
140
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(JAGs).143 This aspect of the legalization of warfare was part of the
explanation for the dispute over the OLC opinions between the OLC
and JAGs.144 The Bush Administration policy of asserting that the
Geneva Convention protections did not apply to those captured
during the war on terror was defended with the assertion that the war
on terrorism—though a war and not a criminal matter for the
courts—was a different type of war;145 and thus, the Geneva
Convention did not apply as commonly understood in post World
War II conflicts like Korea, Vietnam,146 or the first Gulf War. The
143

Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the
Military: A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV.
1815 (2007).
144
Id.
145
Sulmasy and Yoo write that this difference is significant both in
understanding the nature of the attacks of 9/11 and in the civilian/military
relationship over war policy. They write:
Another cause of different preferences is the nature of the fight
against al Qaeda. The United States continues to justify its
policies with principles embodied in the laws of war. These
rules, however, were drafted primarily to deal with two types of
armed conflict—wars between nation-states, and internal civil
wars. The September 11th attacks introduced a different type of
armed conflict, one between a nation-state and an international
terrorist organization with international reach and the ability to
inflict levels of destruction previously only in the hands of states.
Claims of deference to military expertise will not prove as
compelling to civilians when the rules of warfare are being
adapted to a new situation.
Id. at 1835 (internal citations omitted).
146
Vietnam was a significant point in the history of the JAGs in
operational warfare involvement due to the nature of the war, the blurring of battle
lines, identification of the enemy, the nature in which the military engaged the war,
and the nature of the loss of the war. As Sulmasy and Yoo explain:
The American experience in Vietnam changed perceptions of the
role of law in warfare. The Vietnam War raised novel tactical
and legal issues . . . This experience, where lawlessness and legal
complexities impacted combat operations, encouraged the
increased involvement of JAGs in wartime decisions. The
Vietnam environment blurred the line between civilian and
enemy fighters, and the law of armed conflict became
increasingly difficult to apply in combat situations.
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war on terror was not like these conventional wars, and the rules
governing such conflicts did not apply to the like of al Qaeda.
Leaving aside the policy aspects of this assertion, as a legal
matter the answer failed to convince significant parts of the
Executive Branch’s legal community,147 especially the uniformed
In addition, the media was now reporting on the conduct
of the war . . . .
. . . The unpopular war and relative shock of witnessing
the brutal nature of warfare itself created increased concern as to
the Armed Forces’ conduct in warfare. . . . .
This concern with the lawfulness of combat operations
by the U.S. military was highlighted by the singular case of
Lieutenant William Calley and the atrocity that occurred at My
Lai in March 1968 . . . .
. . . This incident, coupled with the emerging emphasis
on the law of armed conflict, led to a variety of investigations by
both civilian and military leaders. One problem was evident to
the investigators: The United States maintained a woefully
inadequate training program for soldiers on the laws of war. As a
result, the Department of Defense placed primary responsibility
for this training on JAGs. This new role provided military
lawyers their first entrée into impacting war fighting and
promoting adherence to the laws of armed conflict.
Subsequent conflicts in Grenada, Panama, and the
Persian Gulf continued to transform the role of JAGs. By the
1990s, JAGs became an intimate part of operational advice to
combatant commanders. In the Kosovo campaign, JAGs were an
integral component of the decisionmaking process in military
operations. JAGs were now teaching the laws of war to all
members of the Armed Forces, performing mission and
operational legal analysis, actively participating in war games,
drafting (rather than merely advising on) rules of engagement,
participating in the targeting process, and even reviewing battle
plans and orders. As a direct result, JAGs are now found at every
layer of the command structure.
Id. at 1839–41 (internal citations omitted).
147
See, e.g., Alberto J. Mora, Memorandum for Inspector General,
Department of the Navy, Statement for the Record: Office of General Counsel
Involvement in Interrogation Issues (June 18, 2004) [hereinafter Mora Memo];
Colin Powell, Counsel to the President Assistant to the President for National
Security Affairs, Draft Decision Memorandum for the President on the
Applicability of the Geneva Convention to the Conflict in Afghanistan (Jan. 26,
2002); William H. Taft IV, General Counsel to the President, Comments on your
paper on the Geneva Convention (Feb. 2, 2002); see also Alberto Gonzales, White
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military justice community.148 The JAGs provided the Bush
Administration DOD Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and

House General Counsel to the President, Decision Re: Application of the Geneva
Convention on Prisoners of War to the Conflict with al Qaeda and the Taliban (Jan.
25, 2002) (provided President Bush with a summary of the arguments that
Secretary Powel and William Taft made against the OLC memos asserting the
Geneva Convention did not apply to captured al Qaeda and Taliban fighters;
President Bush affirmed the OLC); President George W. Bush, Memorandum on
Humane Treatment of al Qaeda and Taliban Detainees (Feb. 7, 2002).
148
The uniform Judge Advocates General voiced various concerns
regarding the opinions of the OLC and the general issue of not applying the Geneva
Convention to captured detainees. For example, Kevin M. Sandkuhler, Brigadier
General, USMC, Staff Judge Advocate to the Commandant, Marine Corp, wrote to
the General Counsel of the Air Force:
1. In addition to comments we submitted 5 February, we
concur with the recommendations submitted by the Navy (TJAG
RADM Lohr), the Air Force (TJAG MGen Rives), and the Joint
Staff Legal Counsel's Office. Their recommendations dealt with
policy considerations, contention with the OLC opinion, and
foreign interpretations of GC IV (Civilians) and customary
international law, respectively.
2. The common thread among our recommendations is
concern for service members. OLC does not represent the
services; thus, understandably, concern for service members is
not reflected in their opinion. Notably, their opinion is silent on
the UCMJ and foreign views of international law.
....
. . . When assessing whether to use exceptional
interrogation techniques, consideration should be given to the
possible adverse effects on U.S. Armed Forces culture and selfimage which suffered during the Vietnam conflict and at other
times due to perceived law of war violations. DOD policy
indoctrinated in the DOD Law of War Program in 1979 and
subsequent service regulations, greatly restored the culture and
self-image of U.S. Armed Forces by establishing high
benchmarks of compliance with the principles and spirit of the
law of war and humane treatment of all persons in U.S. Armed
Forces custody. In addition, consideration should be given to
whether implementation of such techniques is likely to result in
adverse impacts for DOD personnel who are captured or
detained [become POWs], including possible perceptions by
other nations that the United States is lowering standards related
to the treatment of prisoners and other detainees, generally.
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Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the
U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism149 with their own legal
analysis of the OLC opinions and the obligations that the U.S. had
under the United Nations Convention Against Torture (CAT) and the
Geneva Conventions.150 Rumsfeld ordered the U.S. Department of
Defense (DOD) General Counsel to establish the working group to
review all of the pertinent issues relating to the interrogation of
detainees held by the U.S. Armed Forces on January 15, 2003.151
The working group was chaired by the General Counsel of the Air
Force.152 The order was issued after the General Counsel of the
Navy, Alberto J. Mora, threatened to issue a legal opinion that some
of the eighteen methods approved by Rumsfeld on December 2, 2002
“constituted cruel and unusual treatment or torture and that use of the
techniques would violate domestic and international law.” (This
prompted Rumsfeld to resend the December 2, 2002 approval memo
on January 15, 2003).153
General Jack L. Rives, Major General, U.S. Air Force,
Deputy Judge Advocate General, in a memo to the General Counsel
of the Air Force, commented on the practical impact of informing the
military that the Geneva Convention does not apply to interrogations

Memorandum for General Counsel of the Air Force, Working Group
Recommendations on Detainee Interrogations 1–2 (Feb. 27, 2003). Italics in
original show wording that General Sandkuhler recommended be placed in the
DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE GLOBAL
WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DRAFT REPORT (Mar. 6, 2003). The final report
was released April 4, 2003. Both reports are reprinted in KAREN J. GREENBERG,
THE TORTURE PAPERS: THE ROAD TO ABU GHRAIB (Karen J. Greenberg & Joshua
L. Dratel eds., 2005) [hereinafter THE TORTURE PAPERS].
149
DOD WORKING GROUP REPORT ON DETAINEE INTERROGATION IN THE
GLOBAL WAR ON TERRORISM: ASSESSMENT OF LEGAL, HISTORICAL, POLICY, AND
OPERATIONAL CONSIDERATIONS DRAFT REPORT (Mar. 6, 2003).
150
Id.
151
THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 148, at 238.
152
Id. at 240.
153
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, OFFICE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DRAFT
REPORT, (U) INVESTIGATION INTO THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNSEL’S MEMORANDA
ON ISSUES RELATING TO THE CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY’S USE OF
“ENHANCED INTERROGATION TECHNIQUES” ON SUSPECTED TERRORISTS 48 (2008);
see also DAVID COLE, THE TORTURE MEMOS: RATIONALIZING THE UNTHINKABLE
17 (David Cole ed., 2009); Mora Memo, supra note 147, at 14–15.
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of captured enemy combatants. His concern was that legal
distinctions have consequences. He wrote:
While the detainees’ status as unlawful belligerents
may not entitle them to protections of the Geneva
Conventions, that is a legal distinction that may be
lost on the members of the armed forces. Approving
exceptional interrogation techniques may be seen as
giving official approval and legal sanction to the
application of interrogation techniques that U.S.
Armed Forces have heretofore been trained are
unlawful . . . .
General use of exceptional techniques
(generally, having substantially greater risk than those
currently, routinely used by U.S. Armed Forces
interrogators), even though lawful, may create
uncertainty among interrogators regarding the
appropriate limits of interrogations, and may
adversely affect the cultural self-image of the U.S.
armed forces.154
Thomas J. Romig, Major General, U.S. Army, Judge
Advocate General, was blunt in his criticism of the logic of the OLC
legal advice to the DOD. He wrote to the General Counsel of the Air
Force:
3. (U) While the OLC analysis speaks to a
number of defenses that could be raised on behalf of
those who engage in interrogation techniques later
perceived to be illegal, the “bottom line” defense
proffered by OLC is an exceptionally broad concept of
“necessity.” This defense is based upon the premise
that any existing federal statutory provision or
international obligation is unconstitutional per se,
where it otherwise prohibits conduct viewed by the
154

Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Comments on Draft Report
and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and
Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed
Forces in the War on Terrorism 1–2 (Feb. 6, 2003).
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President, acting in his capacity as Commander-inChief, as essential to his capacity to wage war. I
question whether this theory would ultimately prevail
in either the U.S. courts or in any international forum.
If such a defense is not available, soldiers ordered to
use otherwise illegal techniques run a substantial risk
of criminal prosecution or personal liability arising
from a civil lawsuit.
4. (U) The OLC opinion states further that
customary international law cannot bind the U.S.
Executive Branch as it is not part of the federal law.
As such, any presidential decision made in the context
of the ongoing war on terrorism constitutes a
“controlling” Executive act; one that immediately and
automatically displaces any contrary provision of
customary international law. This view runs contrary
to the historic position taken by the United States
Government concerning such laws and, in our
opinion, could adversely impact DOD interests
worldwide. On the one hand, such a policy will open
us to international criticism that the “U.S. is a law
unto itself.”
On the other, implementation of
questionable techniques will very likely establish a
new baseline for acceptable practice in this area,
putting our service personnel at far greater risk and
vitiating many of the POW/detainee safeguards the
U.S. has worked hard to establish over the past five
decades.155
The JAGs concurred that there were serious policy as well as
legal156 errors and ramifications to the OLC opinions.157 They all
155

Memorandum for General Counsel of the Department of the Air Force,
Draft Report and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal,
Policy and Operational Issues Related to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the
U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism 1 (Mar. 3, 2003) [hereinafter March 3,
2003 Memorandum], available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.
156
Michael F. Lohr, Rear Admiral, JAGC, U.S. Navy, Judge Advocate
General, who took issue with the draft report conclusion (echoing the August 2002
Memo) that if a detainee was harmed during an interrogation he could claim that it
was done to prevent another Al Qaeda attack. Admiral Lohr informed the
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Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1. Admiral Lohr asserted:
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March 3, 2003

There are domestic limits on the President’s power to interrogate
prisoners. One of them is Congress's advice and consent to the
US ratification to the Geneva Conventions that limit the
interrogation of POWs. The willingness of the Executive, and of
the Legislative Branch, to enforce those restrictions is a different
matter.
March 3, 2003 Memorandum, supra note 155, at 1.
157
See generally Mora Memo, supra note 147. General Rives concluded
in an opinion to the Air Force Judge Advocate General that
1. (U) In drafting the subject report and
recommendations, the legal opinions of the Department of
Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (DoJ/OLC), were relied on
almost exclusively. Although the opinions of DoJ/OLC are to be
given a great deal of weight within the Executive Branch, their
positions on several of the Working Group’s issues are
contentious. As our discussion demonstrate, others within and
outside the Executive Branch are likely to disagree . . . .
2. (U) Several of the more extreme interrogation
techniques, on their face, amount to violations of domestic
criminal law and the UCMJ (e.g., assault). Applying the more
extreme techniques during the interrogation of detainees places
the interrogators and the chain of command at risk of criminal
accusations domestically. Although a wide range of defenses to
these accusations theoretically apply, it is impossible to be
certain that any defense will be successful at trial; our domestic
courts may well disagree with DoJ/OLC’s interpretation of the
law. Further, while the current administration is not likely to
pursue prosecution, it is impossible to predict how future
administrations will view the use of such techniques.
3. (U) Additionally, other nations are unlikely to agree
with DoJ/OLC’s interpretation of the law in some instances.
Other nations may disagree with the President’s status
determination regarding the Operation ENDURING FREEDOM
(OEF) detainees; they may conclude that the detainees are POWs
entitled to all of the protections of the Geneva Conventions.
Treating OEF detainees inconsistently with the Conventions
arguably “lowers the bar” for the treatment of U.S. POWs in
future conflicts. Even where nations agree with the President’s
status determination, many would view the more extreme
interrogation techniques as violative of other international law
(other treaties or customary international law) and perhaps
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warned that the use of enhanced techniques, and the policy initiatives
that placed limits on the applicability of the Geneva Conventions,
reduced the self-image of the U.S. military, lowered the bar on the
standards of treatment of the enemy in times of war, opened the
military to possible prosecution in both domestic and international
courts due to the use of enhanced interrogation techniques, and
placed captured American military personnel at risk of torture by the
enemy due to the American policy of weakened observance of the
Geneva Convention standards regarding its treatment of captured
enemy combatants.158
The opinions of the uniformed armed forces legal community
did not prevail159 in part because the OLC opinions were considered
dispositive on both the applicability of the CAT and the Geneva
Convention to the question of the definition of and the use of
enhanced interrogation and the power of the President to determine
the treatment of captured enemy combatants.
The civilian
policymakers in the Pentagon provided a final report to Secretary
Rumsfeld, Final Report and Recommendations of the Working Group
to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to
violative of their own domestic law. This puts the interrogators
and the chain of command at risk of criminal accusations abroad,
either in foreign domestic courts or in international fora, to
include the ICC.
Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Final Report and Recommendations of the
Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and Operational Issues Relating to
Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War on Terrorism
1 (Feb. 5, 2003), available at http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.
158
See supra notes 147–48, 154–57; infra notes 159, 161 and
accompanying text.
159
The opinion of the JAGs did not prevail, in no small part, as a result of
the OLC advice and its publication of the Military Interrogations Memo which
supported the techniques in Rumsfeld’s December 2002 memo. The working
Group developed its policy recommendations between January 18 and 29, 2003 and
“during this period, OLC delivered its draft legal memo on interrogation techniques
[and] contributions from the members of the Working Group, including OGC,
began to be rejected if they did not conform to the OLC guidance.” See Mora
Memo, supra note 147, at 16–18. The process was such that because the OLC
opinion was considered binding “it became evident to me and my OCG colleagues
that the Working Group report being assembled would contain profound mistakes
in its legal analysis, in large measure because of its reliance on the flawed OLC
memo.” Id.
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Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed Forces in the War
on Terrorism (April 4, 2003), which approved thirty-five techniques
that could be used by the military personnel.160 They included many
of the same techniques authorized by the August 2002 Memo, CIA
Interrogation, and Military Interrogation opinions. General Rives,
Deputy Judge Advocate General of the Air Force, warned of the
political ramifications of the OLC opinions and the techniques being
approved by the DOD. He warned:
Should any information concerning the exceptional
techniques become public, it is likely to be
exaggerated/distorted in both the U.S. and
international media. This could have a negative
impact on international, and perhaps even domestic,
support for the war on terrorism. It could likewise
have a negative impact on public perception of the
U.S. military in general.161
This is exactly what happened. The Abu Ghraib scandal along with
the leaking of the OLC August 2002 Memo forever blackened the
policy arguments made by the Bush Administration that it was in
compliance with the rule of law and that the war on terror was
different. The Abu Ghraib and the later GITMO abuse scandals gave
evidence to those who asserted that the U.S. had outright authorized
torture and other inhuman tactics in violation of international law and
that the U.S. was acting as a law unto itself.162 This was the exact
reaction the uniformed armed forces legal community warned would
happen. The Bush Administration thereafter battled the narrative that
it had sacrificed the law, and the rule of law, on the altar of American

160

See THE TORTURE PAPERS, supra note 148, at 340–43. See also
JOSEPH MARGULIES, GUANTANAMO AND THE ABUSE OF PRESIDENTIAL POWER
105–06 (2006).
161
Memorandum for SAF/GC from AF/JA, Comments on Draft Report
and Recommendations of the Working Group to Assess the Legal, Policy and
Operational Issues Relating to Interrogation of Detainees Held by the U.S. Armed
Forces in the War on Terrorism (Feb. 6, 2003), available at
http://balkin.blogspot.com/jag.memos.pdf.
162
Garrison, supra note 9.
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fears and the arrogant desire to make policy unilaterally in the name
of providing security for America.163
As Benjamin Franklin observed, a nation that trades freedom
and liberty for security will lose both and deserves neither.164 A
republic maintains freedom and liberty, in times of war and national
security crisis, by maintaining and defending the rule of law, which
involves interpreting the law correctly.165 The rule of law is a
principle in which all segments of society, including the government,
is subservient to the dictates of the law, and the law should be
consulted and adhered to in all policy matters.166 But “failing to
follow the rule of law” is not synonymous with failure to apply what
the law rules correctly.167 More importantly, the rule of law does not
require action or inaction based on what people want the law to rule
when it doesn’t.168 The error by the OLC was not that the rule of law
was not honored. The rule of law is honored when the OLC is sought
to provide a legal opinion on a proposed policy. The error was not
that the OLC got the law (the meaning of Section 2340) wrong in the
August 2002 Memo but that the approach of the memo was an
abandonment of the traditional Neutral Expositor of the best view of
the law as advocated by General Barr and others for the Private
Lawyer model.169
The OLC proposed legal answers to questions not asked and
asserted that any law, including a domestic criminal statute outlawing
torture, was unconstitutional if applied to the Commander-in-Chief
power of the President in time of war.170 Although the OLC and,

163

Id.
Benjamin Franklin, Pennsylvania Assembly: Reply to the Governor
(Nov. 11, 1755), in THE PAPERS OF BENJAMIN FRANKLIN VOL. 6, 242 (Leonard W.
Labaree ed., 1963).
165
Arthur H. Garrison, The Rule of Law and What the Law Rules: The
History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions on the Commander-in-Chief Power
and the Department of Justice Office of Legal Counsel Torture and Commander-inChief Opinions During the First Two Years of the Bush Administration after
September 11 (unpublished doctoral thesis, on file with the Northeastern University
Library system).
166
Id.
167
Garrison, supra note 3.
168
Id.
169
Garrison, supra notes 3 and 9.
170
Id. See also supra note 115 and accompanying text.
164
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before that, the Attorney General have issued opinions favorable to
the President in defining the breadth and depth of the Commander-inChief power,171 never before had the OLC or the Department of
Justice made the assertion that the president was not bound to comply
with a criminal statute because it interfered with his general
Commander-in-Chief power, not even in the days of World War
II!172
Since Attorney General Bradford advised President
Washington that he did not have to release diplomatic papers to
Congress,173 and General Bates affirmed the power of President
Lincoln to suspend the writ of habeas corpus in order to deal with the
slave owner rebellion in 1861174 Attorneys General and the OLC
have historically protected the inherent powers of the President; but
the Bush Administration OLC took assertion of presidential power
during war to a new level. Even the OLC opinions issued during the
Nixon Administration, during the expansion of a secret war into
Cambodia, and those of the Reagan and the First Bush
Administrations never asserted that domestic criminal law can be
disregarded by the President.175 Even Dellinger’s OLC opinion,176
which proposed there are times when a President can disregard a
federal statute, never asserted a President could disregard a federal
criminal statute. Dellinger did accept that under the Constitution the
President is obligated to protect his office from encroachments by the
171

Arthur H. Garrison, The History of Executive Branch Legal Opinions
on the Power of the President as Commander-in-Chief from Washington to Obama,
43 CUMB. L. REV. (forthcoming 2013).
172
At the height of World War II, the Executive Branch never asserted
that judicial review of war policy, much less a criminal statute, was beyond judicial
review. It should be remembered that it was during World War II that the court
determined the boundaries of the internment policy and set limits on its
implementation. See ARTHUR H. GARRISON, SUPREME COURT JURISPRUDENCE IN
TIMES OF NATIONAL CRISIS, TERRORISM, AND WAR: A HISTORICAL PERSPECTIVE
201–35 (2011).
173
Id. at 266.
174
Id. at 56–60.
175
Garrison, supra note 3.
176
Memorandum for the Honorable Abner J. Mikva, Counsel to the
President Re: Presidential Authority to Decline to Execute Unconstitutional
Statutes, 18 OPINION OF THE OFFICE OF LEGAL COUNS. 199 (Nov. 2, 1994),
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/nonexcut.htm. What is interesting is that
Yoo never cited this opinion for the proposition that the President could disregard
the prohibition on torture since it impacted on his Commander-in-Chief power.
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Legislative Branch; and, in doing so, has the authority to make
independent determinations on what the Constitution requires,
especially when the dispute is not justiciable in the Supreme Court.
Dellinger asserted in his memo:
6. The President has enhanced responsibility to
resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon
the constitutional powers of the Presidency. Where
the President believes that an enactment
unconstitutionally limits his powers, he has the
authority to defend his office and decline to abide by
it, unless he is convinced that the Court would
disagree with his assessment . . . .
Some legislative encroachments on executive
authority, however, will not be justiciable or are for
other reasons unlikely to be resolved in court. If
resolution in the courts is unlikely and the President
cannot look to a judicial determination, he must
shoulder the responsibility of protecting the
constitutional role of the presidency. This is usually
true, for example, of provisions limiting the
President's authority as Commander-in-Chief. Where
it is not possible to construe such provisions
constitutionally, the President has the authority to act
on his understanding of the Constitution.177
Dellinger made clear that the President “should presume that
enactments are constitutional [and] the President should give great
deference to the fact that Congress passed the statute and that
Congress believed it was upholding its obligation to enact
constitutional legislation;”178 and, if the President believed the law to
be unconstitutional, he should declare it as such and submit the law
to the Supreme Court for final determination.179
177

Id. at 201.
Id. at 200.
179
Dellinger notes:

178

5. Where the President’s independent constitutional
judgment and his determination of the Court’s probable decision
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IV. THE OLC, INTRA-EXECUTIVE BRANCH LEGAL POLICYMAKING,
AND WHY IT MATTERS WHAT THE OLC SAYS
Although the OLC holds the institutional and administrative
authority of being dispositive on questions of law within the
Executive Branch, this does not mean that there is not inter-agency
competition for acceptance of those opinions by the President. In the
Bush Administration, the JAGs opposed the OLC and its opinions
regarding the applicability of the Geneva Conventions and the
legality of proposed interrogation techniques.180 In the third year of
the Obama Administration, an OLC opinion was reportedly181
converge on a conclusion of unconstitutionality, the President
must make a decision about whether or not to comply with the
provision. That decision is necessarily specific to context, and it
should be reached after careful weighing of the effect of
compliance with the provision on the constitutional rights of
affected individuals and on the executive branch's constitutional
authority. Also relevant is the likelihood that compliance or noncompliance will permit judicial resolution of the issue. That is,
the President may base his decision to comply (or decline to
comply) in part on a desire to afford the Supreme Court an
opportunity to review the constitutional judgment of the
legislative branch. 6. The President has enhanced responsibility
to resist unconstitutional provisions that encroach upon the
constitutional powers of the Presidency. Where the President
believes that an enactment unconstitutionally limits his powers,
he has the authority to defend his office and decline to abide by
it, unless he is convinced that the Court would disagree with his
assessment. If the President does not challenge such provisions
(i.e., by refusing to execute them), there often will be no occasion
for judicial consideration of their constitutionality; a policy of
consistent Presidential enforcement of statutes limiting his power
thus would deny the Supreme Court the opportunity to review the
limitations and thereby would allow for unconstitutional
restrictions on the President's authority.
Id. at 200–01.
180
See supra Part III.
181
See Trevor W. Morrison, Libya, “Hostilities,” The Office of Legal
Counsel, and the Process of Executive Branch Legal Interpretation, 124 HARV. L.
REV. FORUM 62 (2011); Charlie Savage & Thom Shanker, Scores of U.S. Strikes in
Libya Followed Handoff to NATO, N.Y. TIMES, June 11, 2011, at A8; Bruce
Ackerman, Legal Acrobatics, Illegal war, N.Y. TIMES (June 20, 2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/21/opinion/21Ackerman.html; Jack Balkin,
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opposed by the State Department Legal Advisor over the
applicability of the War Powers Resolution (WPR) regarding the
U.S. Armed Forces’ participation in a multinational force to enforce a
United Nations Resolution against Libya. The OLC, backed by
Attorney General Holder, advised President Obama that the WPR
“hostilities” provision is applicable to the Commander-in-Chief
power when “the military operations that the President anticipated
ordering would be sufficiently extensive in ‘nature, scope, and
duration’” to constitute a “war” requiring prior specific congressional
approval under the Declaration of War Clause”.182 In other words,
the WPR 60-day rule is implicated by the “hostilities” provision but
that, in turn, is defined by the Declaration of War Clause. The OLC
concluded that the proposed action did not activate the Declaration of
War Clause, so the WPR Congressional prior approval provision was
not invoked by the proposed deployment of troops.183 The State
Department advised the President that the WPR was applicable to his
decision to deploy troops, but “hostilities” is a factual and policy
question, not a legal one; and, although “hostilities” occurs when
American forces are in a situation in which they are fired upon, the
fact that they are fired upon does not mean they are in “hostilities”
George W. Obama and the OLC, BALKINIZATION (June 18, 2011, 8:35 AM),
http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/06/george-w-obama-and-olc.html;
Jack
Goldsmith, President Obama Rejected DOJ and DOD Advice, and Sided with
Harold Koh, on War Powers Resolution, LAWFARE (June 17, 2011, 11:38 PM),
http://www.lawfareblog.com/2011/06/president-obama-rejected-doj-and-dodadvice-and-sided-with-harold-koh-on-war-powers-resolution/; Michael Isikoff, On
Libya, President Obama evaded rules on legal disputes, scholars say Decision to
override Justice Department unit called 'disturbing' by one former legal adviser,
NEWS
(June
21,
2011,
6:09
AM),
NBC
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/43474045/ns/politics-white_house/t/libyapresident-obama-evaded-rules-legal-disputes-scholars-say/#.T-O_3JhnzIQ;
Eric
Posner & Adrian Vermeule, Libyan Legal Limbo: Why there’s nothing wrong with
Obama ignoring some of his own legal advisors on Libya, SLATE (July 5, 2011,
6:17
PM),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2011/06/libyan_leg
al_limbo.html; Charles Savage, 2 Top Lawyers Lost to Obama in Libya War Policy
Debate,
N.Y.
TIMES
(June
17,
2011),
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/18/world/africa/18powers.html?pagewanted=all.
182
Caroline D. Krass, Memorandum Opinion for the Attorney General:
Authority to Use Military Force in Libya, 35 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Apr. 1, 2011) at 10,
available at http://www.justice.gov/olc/2011/authority-military-use-in-libya.pdf.
183
Id. at 13.
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that triggers the 60-day rule for withdrawal under the WPR.184 The
distinction between the two opinions was on the meaning of
“hostilities” in which the State Department agreed that the proposed
action constituted hostilities but not the type that required the
activation of the 60-day rule while the OLC asserted that the 60-day
rule is implicated only when the military action constitutes a war.
President Obama accepted the view of the State Department Legal
Advisor on the issue of the meaning and applicability of the WPR
“hostilities” in his report to Congress.185 The result of both opinions

184

Testimony by State Department Legal Advisor Harold Hongju Koh,
Libya and War Powers, U.S. Senate Foreign Relations Committee (June 28, 2011)
(SH 112-89) at 14, available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/2011_hr/libya.pdf.
Mr, Koh explained to Congress that in line with the historical view of the WPR and
the Commander-in-Chief power the State Department’s position on the President’s
deployment of troops is
when U.S. forces engage in a limited military mission that
involves limited exposure for U.S. troops and limited risk of
serious escalation and employs limited military means, we are
not in hostilities of the kind envisioned by the War Powers
Resolution that was intended to trigger an automatic 60-day
pullout.
Id. at 9.
185

UNITED STATES ACTIVITIES IN LIBYA 25 (June 15, 2011), available at
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/politics/documents/united-statesactivities-libya.html (President Barack Obama’s report to Congress regarding U.S.
activities in Libya). The President asserted in his report to Congress:
The President is of the view that the current U.S. military
operations in Libya are consistent with the War Powers
Resolution and do not under that law require further
congressional authorization, because U.S. military operations are
distinct from the kind of “hostilities” contemplated by the
Resolution’s 60-day termination provision. U.S. forces are
playing a constrained and supporting role in a multinational
coalition, whose operations are both legitimated by and limited to
the terms of a United Nations Security Council Resolution that
authorizes the use of force solely to protect civilians and civilian
populated areas under attack or threat of attack and to enforce a
no-fly zone and an arms embargo. U.S. operations do not
involve sustained fighting or active exchanges of fire with hostile
forces, nor do they involve the presence of U.S. ground troops,
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was accepted by the President; the dispute between the OLC and the
State Department was over the legal reasoning each agency provided
to the President regarding the conclusion of law and not the
conclusion of law they both provided. As John P. Elwood, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General for the OLC, testified in 2008, the role of
the OLC is to advise the President of law and, in so doing, protect the
rule of law within the Executive Branch; it is not the role of the OLC
to prevail in policy disputes that might entail the law.
It is true that OLC opinions ordinarily are controlling
within the executive branch on questions of law.
While OLC’s legal advice may inform its
clients’ policy decisions, its legal advice rarely, if
ever, compels the adoption of any particular policy.
Rather, it remains up to the policymakers to decide
whether, and how, to act. . . .
....
But the purpose of OLC opinions is not to
provide cover, even legal protection, for actors. Its
purpose is to help the President effect his duty to take
care that the laws be faithfully executed. So before he
undertakes action, he routinely asks us for legal advice
on matters that might be subject to dispute. That’s the
purpose of OLC opinions.186
Elwood is correct that the OLC’s utility is not in prevailing over
other agencies in the policy application of its legal determinations.
Its utility lies in providing a nonbiased best view of the law
assessment of the law and being prepared to tell the President “no”
and providing that assessment to those who have to apply the law and
policy and bear the responsibility of the results.

U.S. casualties or a serious threat thereof, or any significant
chance of escalation into a conflict characterized by those factors.
Id. at 25.
186

Secret Law and the Threat to Democratic and Accountable
Government: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on the Constitution of the Comm. on
the Judiciary, 110th Cong. 6, 30 (2008) (statement of John P. Elwood, Deputy
Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel) [hereinafter Secret Law].
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Former Solicitor General Paul D. Clement, in a keynote
address at Emory Law School, provided a useful discussion on the
nature of intra-Executive Branch separation of powers and a
description of various forms of statutory interpretation available
within the Executive Branch.187 Although his keynote address
focused on the Office of the Solicitor General, his comments on the
various forms of agency decision making and the consequences of
each is useful in examining the proper role of the OLC. General
Clement explained that there are differences within the field of policy
and law; specifically, there are differences between (1) policymaking
(political agenda preferences) and legal decision making (quasijudicial),188 (2) legal counseling (providing advice on matters that
most likely will not be litigated) and litigating (defending a policy in
court),189 and (3) trial decisions (what cases are brought to court) and
appellate decisions (what cases are appealed).190 The former in each
grouping deals with policy considerations while the latter deals with
quasi-judicial or objective legal determinations. The nonpartisan,
nonpolitical role of the OLC, like the Office of the Solicitor General,
lies in the fact that it does not make decisions based on the political
needs and desires of the Executive Branch per se. Both offices make
decisions based on neutral interpretation of the law. To put the
organizational system within the Justice Department and within the
Executive Branch in perspective, the OLC determines what the law
means and how the law governs the boundaries of executive
policymaking power (Barr Doctrine, Neutral Expositor model), the
Solicitor General determines whether the statute or policy once
implemented can be reasonably defended before the bar of justice
(Court Centered model), and the White House Counsel or the DOJ
Office of Legal Policy determines if a proposed policy is in line with
the political goals and objectives of the President (Independent
Authority, Private Lawyer models).191 Institutionally, the first two

187

Paul D. Clement, The Intra-Executive Separation of Powers: Keynote
Address, 2009 Randolph W. Thrower Symposium, 59 EMORY L.J. 311 (2009).
188
Id. at 315–18.
189
Id. at 318–23.
190
Id. at 323–24.
191
See Darby Morrisroe, Co-Counsel to the President: Assessing the Bush
White House Legal Policymaking Process (Sept. 6, 2009) (APSA 2009 Toronto
Meeting Paper), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1450694.
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agencies involve legal decision-making, and the last two agencies
involve legal policymaking. Put another way, the first two (the OLC
and the Solicitor General) are more concerned with the rule of law
and what the law requires while the last two (the White House
General Counsel and the DOJ Office of Legal Policy) are concerned
with political achievement within the law. There are various
strategies from which an agency empowered to interpret statutory or
constitutional law can approach its role; in general, the two main
approaches are quasi-judicial and policy-oriented. The former
approach functions like a court, with the primary focus on the
meaning of the law rather than achieving a specific policy
consequence of the interpretation. The focus is on establishing and
ruling on what the law provides. The latter approach focuses on the
achievement of a specific policy or political objective. Neither
approach is wrong per se. The issue is which approach is correct
based on the purpose of the agency.
Where the Bush Administration OLC went wrong is that it
produced opinions, the August 2002 Memo and CIA Interrogation
Memo specifically, that abandoned the former role of quasi-judicial
or objective legal determination for the latter role of achieving
political objectives.192 The OLC (specifically John Yoo), in an effort
to be seen as relevant and helpful to the political objectives of the
Administration, abandoned its specific agency role of being the
objective legal advisor to the Administration.193 The rule of law,
which is above politics and policymaking, protects the system of
government; the law governs the actions of politics. The OLC is not
a policy agency to be used as a political ideological weapon or shield
for the White House. Its role is quasi-judicial and it stands as the
agency whose purpose is to apply and defend the law within the
Executive Branch. The failure to adhere to this role explains, in part,
the torture memos.
The distinction in the role and purpose of the OLC compared
to other legal executive branch agencies is not trivial. General
Clement provided five reasons why the distinction between the role
of the OLC and the Office of Solicitor General, and the political
192

See YOO, supra note 98; GOLDSMITH, supra note 100; Goldsmith,
supra note 104 and accompanying text.
193
YOO, supra note 98; GOLDSMITH, supra note 100; Goldsmith, supra
note 104.
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policymaking role of the White House and other agencies and offices
within and outside of the Department of Justice are important. These
include: (1) efficient division of required skills and abilities to
address overall operation within the Executive Branch, (2) the
promotion of good inter-agency relationships, (3) the establishment
of a framework for decision-making, (4) establishing a proper
relationship with the White House, and (5) accountability for
decisions when they are made. It is the last two that are important for
determining how the OLC produced the famed torture memos (from
an agency perspective) and how the distinction between legal
decision making and legal policy making were blurred within the
Bush Administration.194 The White House and the White House
Office of General Counsel, by definition, operate within the area of
politics, policy and power. The Attorney General, appointed by the
President, is tasked with directing the Justice Department in line with
the political views of the President. To insulate the interpretation of
the law from political determinations, the OLC and the Solicitor
General are not invited into policymaking decisions within the White
House. The proper interaction between the White House Counsel,
the OLC, and the Solicitor General should be when the White House
needs a determination on what the law requires and if a proposed
policy or statute can be defended before the bar of justice, not
whether a policy should be implemented, supported, or opposed to
achieve a specific political objective. The OLC, after 9/11, confused
this distinction and division of labor. The OLC became the agency
within the Bush Administration to justify policy rather than
determine what the law required using its best, policy-outcomeneutral, judgment.195
As General Clement correctly explained, there is
accountability when the political branches of the White House
determine and implement a policy because the consequences can
clearly be applied to those who made those determinations. There is
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also clear accountability when those agencies responsible for holding
the line in defining and protecting the rule of law within the
Executive Branch focus exclusively on the rule of law and what the
law rules. The lines of accountability and judgment become blurred
when the agency responsible for politics confuses what is politically
desirable with what is legally required under the rule of law and,
even worse, when the agency responsible for protecting the rule of
law confuses legal analysis with achieving policy objectives.
V. CONCLUSION
In discussing the purpose and history of the Office of the
Attorney General,196 and later the Department of Justice and the
OLC,197 General Bell concluded that all three serve the public
interest by focusing on the observation that “[a]lthough our client is
the government, in the end we serve a more important constituency:
the American people.”198 As one observer of the history of the
Attorney General commented, although
196

In drawing an analogy between the office of the U.S. Attorney General
and the English Attorney General, Professor John Edwards observed the
importance of the duty of the Attorney General to protect the public interest.
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English Attorney General—is that there is a residual
responsibility for the public interest. It is not, I think, without
significance that historically, certainly for the past few centuries,
the Attorney General of England has always been described as
the guardian of the public interest. He is both a member of the
Administration and more . . . He is required to rise above the
partisan obligations of being a member of the prevailing
Administration . . . He has to have regard to the wider
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these several obligations. And it is only to the extent that he
keeps them distinct, where there appears to be a conflict . . . .
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[a]ny cabinet officer is bound to act lawfully and not
disobey the law . . . no other cabinet officer is the
“custodian of the law” within the executive branch the
way the Attorney General is . . . . That is, the office is
created to provide within the executive branch a quasijudicial person—a member of the bar—who keeps the
executive branch under law, and to whom the
President and other executive officials can look for a
uniform, authoritative pronouncement of the law, at
least short of the courts.199
The institutional purpose of the OLC is to provide the
President, the White House General Counsel, the Attorney General,
and the various agencies within the Executive Branch legal opinions
on what the law is and if a proposed policy is in violation of the
law.200 The OLC, as an agency within the Justice Department, has
the exclusive authority to determine the meaning of the law and its
determinations are determinative and authoritative on all Executive
Branch agencies with one exception—the Office of Solicitor
General.201 The power of the OLC to interpret the law and its
meaning regarding Executive Branch policymaking is significant
(again, as an institutional matter) because “an agency’s approach to
statutory interpretation is in part a function of the policymaking form
through which it acts.”202 In other words, how the OLC perceived its
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function within the policymaking process during the first two years
after the events of 9/11 governed how it produced its memos.
Although it is a truism that the Attorney General and the Assistant
Attorney General for the OLC are political appointees and as such
should reflect the political and legal philosophy of the President who
appoints them, both have a higher obligation to interpret the law
without regard for the political objectives of the President. To be
sure, there are other branches within the Executive Branch that
support and implement purely political objectives of the President.
The point is that the OLC is not one of them. The OLC, exercising
the power of the Attorney General, is tasked with providing the best,
nonpolitical view of the law to the President. In doing so, the OLC
assists the President in making sure that the laws are faithfully
executed. It is this purpose, history, and tradition that supports,
justifies, and legitimates the quasi-judicial power that rests in the
hands of the OLC, which originate in the Article II power of the
President.

